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Abstract
This paper studies how cross-country di⁄erences in labor market institutions shape the pat-
tern of international trade, focusing on workers￿skill acquisition. I develop a model in which
workers undertake non-contractible activities to acquire ￿rm-speci￿c skills on the job. In the
model, workers have more incentive to acquire ￿rm-speci￿c skills relative to general skills in a
more protective labor market. When sectors are di⁄erent in the dependence on these two types
of skills, workers￿skill acquisition turns labor laws into a source of comparative advantage. By
embedding the model in an open-economy framework with heterogeneous ￿rms, sectors with
di⁄erent levels of dependence on ￿rm-speci￿c skills, and countries with varying degrees of la-
bor protection, I show that countries with more protective labor laws export relatively more in
￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive sectors through both the intensive and extensive margins of trade.
I then estimate returns to ￿rm tenure for di⁄erent U.S. manufacturing sectors over the period
of 1974-1993, and use the estimates as sector proxies for ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity to test the
theoretical predictions. By implementing the Helpman-Melitz-Rubinstein (2008) framework to
estimate sector-level gravity equations for 84 countries in 1995, I ￿nd supporting evidence for
the predicted e⁄ects of labor market institutions on both margins of trade.
Keywords: Labor market institutions, heterogeneous ￿rms, margins of trade, trade pat-
terns, ￿rm-speci￿c skills
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Recent research in international trade shows that contracting and legal institutions of a country
can shape its comparative advantage.1 Labor market institutions, which also vary widely across
countries, receive relatively less attention in the studies on international trade patterns. While
there is an extensive strand of research examining how labor market regulations are linked to labor
market outcomes, few have examined their e⁄ects on workers￿investment decisions. Even less has
been said about how such e⁄ects can in turn determine a country￿ s comparative advantage.2
This paper ￿lls this void by studying how cross-country di⁄erences in labor market institutions
are related to the pattern of trade. In particular, I focus on the channel through which labor
market institutions a⁄ect workers￿on-the-job skill acquisition. The idea is that when labor laws
become more protective, workers obtain a higher de facto bargaining power with respect to their
employers, and thus have more incentive to acquire ￿rm-speci￿c skills relative to general skills on
the job. Thus, countries with more protective labor laws have a comparative advantage in sectors
for which ￿rm-speci￿c skills are more important. I test this hypothesis by estimating the gravity
equation at the sector level, and ￿nd evidence that countries with more protective labor laws export
relatively more in ￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive sectors.
A simple model is constructed to highlight how protective labor laws, by enhancing workers￿
bargaining power, induce workers to acquire ￿rm-speci￿c skills. In the model, both general and
￿rm-speci￿c skills can enhance a worker￿ s productivity. The level of general skills is exogenously
given, whereas the level of ￿rm-speci￿c skills is determined by workers￿on-the-job skill acquisition.
The activities of skill acquisition are non-contractible, such that employers are unable to impose
their preferred levels of investments on their workers. Thus, the combination of non-contractibility
and relationship-speci￿city of investments results in ex-post bargaining over the division of joint
surplus between the employer and the workers. Anticipating payo⁄s from ex-post bargaining,
workers acquire ￿rm-speci￿c skills. Since workers are not the full residual claimants of the gains
from investments, a hold-up problem arises, resulting in under-investment in ￿rm-speci￿c skills
relative to the ￿rst-best level under complete contracts. In this environment, despite the associated
well-known ine¢ ciencies, stringent labor laws raise workers￿bargaining power and can actually
alleviate some of the under-investment problem. These e⁄ects of labor laws on ￿rm productivity
are more pronounced for more speci￿c skill-intensive sectors, and therefore act as a potential source
of comparative advantage.
I embed the model in an open-economy framework of trade in di⁄erentiated products based on
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). In the model, ￿rms vary by productivity, sectors di⁄er in their
levels of dependence on ￿rm-speci￿c skills, and countries have di⁄erent degrees of labor protection.
1This literature includes Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Costinot (2009), among others. See the section on
related literature below for details.
2This small literature includes Saint-Paul (1997), Br￿gemann (2003) and Cuæat and Melitz (2010a; 2010b). See
the literature review below for details.
2Firms face both ￿xed and variable trade costs to export. With the presence of ￿xed trade costs
and ￿rm heterogeneity, only relatively more productive ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to export. The
model predicts that all else equal, when labor laws become more protective, ￿rms in more speci￿c
skill-intensive sectors have a relative cost advantage in production. Thus, in countries where labor
laws are more protective, the average volume of ￿rms￿exports (intensive margin) and the fraction
of ￿rms exporting (extensive margin) are both relatively higher in speci￿c skill-intensive sectors.
I then extend Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein￿ s (2008) empirical framework to a multi-sector
setting, and develop a two-stage regression framework to test the model￿ s predictions. In partic-
ular, the ￿rst stage of the empirical framework is a Probit equation estimating the probability of
countries￿selecting into trade partners in a sector, whereas the second stage is a gravity equation
augmented to take into account the extensive margin of trade.
For the purpose of testing the theoretical predictions, I construct sectoral measures for the
importance of ￿rm-speci￿c skills in production. To my knowledge, there has been no attempt by
researchers to estimate them across sectors. To this end, I follow the labor economics literature on
the e⁄ects of seniority on wages (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; Altonji and Williams,
2005) in interpreting returns to ￿rm tenure as evidence of the presence of ￿rm-speci￿c skills. Al-
though there exist alternative explanations for an upward-sloping wage pro￿le due to ￿rm tenure,
such as theories of incentive contracts to elicit workers￿e⁄ort (Lazear, 1981), asymmetric infor-
mation about workers￿abilities (Katz and Gibbons, 1991) and wage compression due to search
frictions in labor markets (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999), I adopt the traditional view and associate
high returns to ￿rm tenure with the importance of ￿rm-speci￿c skills (Becker, 1964). As such, I
estimate returns to ￿rm tenure in each sector using a Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID)
sample over 1974-1993. With the assumption that real wages are positively correlated with the
underlying marginal product of labor, I use the estimated returns to tenure as sector proxies for
speci￿c skill intensity for 62 SIC 3-digit sectors (out of 118 total).
Finally, I estimate sector-level gravity equations to test the theoretical predictions. Following
the existing empirical literature on comparative advantage,3 I include in the gravity equation an
interaction term between a country￿ s index of labor protection and a sector proxy for speci￿c skill
intensity to capture the di⁄erential impacts of labor laws across sectors. Using OLS, I ￿nd a
positive and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on the interaction term, supporting the theoretical prediction
about the intensive margin of trade. Then I implement the two-stage estimation procedure. The
results from the ￿rst-stage estimation con￿rm that countries with more protective labor laws are
more likely to export in speci￿c skill-intensive sectors (the extensive margin). The second-stage
gravity estimation, after correcting both the omitted variables and the selection biases, con￿rms
the OLS ￿ndings about the intensive margin of trade. To ensure that my results are not driven
by other sources of comparative advantage, I also control for countries￿factor endowments, income
3This literature includes, among others, Romalis (2003), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Manova (2010).
3and contracting institutions in both selection and gravity equations. Moreover, an interaction term
between a country￿ s index of labor protection and a sectoral measure of volatility is included to
control for the previously studied channel through which labor market institutions a⁄ect trade
patterns. In sum, in addition to checking the robustness of my results, I ￿nd evidence supporting
the existing theoretical predictions on trade patterns.
To preview the empirical ￿ndings, in Figure 2, I plot countries￿export specialization in speci￿c
skill-intensive sectors against the degree of labor protection for the countries in my sample.4 A
positive relationship between the two suggests that countries with more protective labor laws have
their exports biased toward speci￿c skill-intensive sectors. The relationship is economically signi￿-
cant. An increase from the 25th to the 75th percentile in the index of labor protection is associated
with an increase in specialization in speci￿c skill-intensive sectors of about 0.4 standard deviation.
Figure 3 con￿rms the robustness of this positive association by controlling for countries￿relative
factor abundance. Figure 4 illustrates a similar pattern among the OECD countries. For instance,
controlling for factor endowment di⁄erences, Sweden, a country with protective labor laws, derives
proportionally more of its exports from speci￿c skill-intensive sectors than the U.S., a country with
￿ exible labor laws.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. The ￿rst strand studies how labor market
institutions a⁄ect workers￿human capital investment decisions (Houseman, 1990; Estevez-Abe et
al., 1999; Hassler et al. 2001; Belot et al., 2007). In particular, Estevez-Abe et al. (1999), among
others in the literature on the ￿varieties of capitalism", postulate that workers have more incentive
to invest in ￿rm- and industry-speci￿c skills instead of portable general skills in countries with
more protective labor laws. They succinctly argue that in developed countries, there could be two
equilibria, with one characterized by high levels of job turnovers, general skills and portable assets;
whereas the other equilibrium characterized by high levels of job tenure, speci￿c skills and speci￿c
assets. Consistent with this theoretical argument, Wasmer (2006) shows in a search theoretical
framework that labor market rigidity induces workers to acquire ￿rm-speci￿c skills relative to
general skills, despite ambiguous welfare e⁄ects. In his model, higher ￿ring costs increase search
frictions in the external labor market and therefore the average duration of the relationships between
workers and their employer. The returns to speci￿c skills are thus higher in equilibrium. Despite the
similarity in the theoretical underpinning, this paper highlights how workers￿investment decisions
shape the pattern of trade. Adding to the existing literature, the current study also provides indirect
evidence based on trade data to support the hypothesis that labor market rigidity is associated
4A country￿ s export specialization in ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensive sectors is a weighted average of sector measures
of speci￿c skill intensity, with weights equal to respective sector shares in a country￿ s total exports. See equation
(14) for detail.
4with more speci￿c skills in a country￿ s labor force, which was asserted but not veri￿ed empirically
before.
Second, this paper is motivated by empirical studies that gauge the importance of ￿rm-speci￿c
skills in production. In labor economics, empirical studies ￿nd positive and signi￿cant ￿rm tenure
e⁄ects on wages. (Kletzer, 1989; Topel, 1991; Jacobson et al., 1993; Buchinsky et al., 2008).5 To
the extent that wages are positively correlated with the marginal product of labor, the estimated
e⁄ects of ￿rm tenure on wages can be taken as indirect evidence of ￿rm-speci￿c skills.6 Consis-
tently, studies in organizational economics ￿nd that specialized non-patentable human capital are
more important than specialized physical capital in determining vertical integration between up-
stream and downstream ￿rms (Monteverde and Teece, 1982; Masten et al., 1989).7 In addition to
con￿rming ￿rms￿provision of incentives for speci￿c-skill investments, these studies underscore the
non-contractible aspect of ￿rm-speci￿c investments, which is a crucial assumption in my theoretical
model.8
This paper complements a growing literature that studies the interaction between labor market
institutions and international trade across countries (Brecher, 1974; Matusz, 1996; Davis, 1998;
Davidson et al., 1999; Davidson and Matusz, 2006). In a series of papers, Helpman and Itskhoki
(2009, 2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki and Redding (2008, 2010) examine theoretically how trade
liberalization, depending on labor market rigidity, a⁄ects unemployment and wage inequality of the
liberalizers di⁄erently. This paper adds to the literature that examines labor market institutions
as a source of comparative advantage. In that literature, Saint-Paul (1997), Br￿gemann (2003)
and Cuæat and Melitz (2010a) consider a world where sectors are di⁄erent in the degree of sales
uncertainty, which can arise from either demand or supply shocks. Common in these studies
is the source of comparative advantage that arises from the interplay between di⁄erent costs of
labor reallocation across countries and varying needs for factor reallocation across sectors. I focus
instead on a country￿ s endogenous comparative advantage stemming from workers￿skill acquisition
in response to their countries￿labor market institutions, in an environment where the importance
of speci￿c skills varies across industries.
Finally, this paper is related to the literature on contracting institutions as a source of compar-
5Within this literature, studies of layo⁄s through no fault of their own (for example, plant closings) show that
laid-o⁄ employees typically earn 15 to 25 percent less on their next jobs. See Kletzer (1998) for a review of this
literature. Although the economic signi￿cance of ￿rm-speci￿c skills in determining wage growth is still subject to
debate, a recent paper by Buchinsky et al. (2004) employs Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to account for
workers￿mobility decisions, and ￿nd that returns to job seniority in the U.S. are higher than those to general working
experience, even higher than what was previously estimated by Topel (1991).
6Importantly, these results are not speci￿c to the ￿ exible U.S. labor market. For instance, Dustmann and Meghir
(2005) ￿nd that in Germany, the returns to sector tenure are almost zero, while the returns to ￿rm tenure are
substantial, especially for the unskilled. This particular ￿nding is consistent with the story that workers acquire more
speci￿c skills in protective labor markets.
7In particular, they ￿nd that in the automobile industry instead of vertical integration, the ￿quasi-integrated"
organizational form with specialized tools owned by the owner and leased to the contractor is common among parts
production ￿rms.
8Malcomson (1997) summarizes the literature on the hold-up problem of human capital investment.
5ative advantage. Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Costinot (2009a), among others, show both
theoretically and empirically that countries with better contracting institutions or legal environ-
ment specialize in the sectors in which production relies more on contract enforcement (such as
sectors that involve complex production technology or relationship-speci￿c investments by suppli-
ers). This paper contributes to this literature by showing empirically the e⁄ects of labor market
institutions on trade patterns. In addition, it highlights their e⁄ects on the extensive margin of
trade. On the theoretical front, it is similar to Antr￿s (2003; 2005), Antr￿s and Helpman (2004)
and Acemoglu et al. (2007) in applying the property-rights approach on studying international
trade.
2 The Closed-Economy Model
In this section, I solve for the ￿rm-level equilibrium in a closed economy, taking demand for goods as
given. The ultimate goal is to show how labor market institutions a⁄ect workers￿skill acquisition,
which in turn a⁄ect ￿rm employment, price, revenue and pro￿t. The open-economy model will be
introduced in section 3.
2.1 Preferences
Consider a closed economy of S + 1 sectors, with one sector producing homogeneous goods, and S
sectors producing di⁄erentiated products. The homogeneous good is the numØraire.
Labor is the only factor of production. The economy is inhabited by a measure L of ex-ante
identical and risk-neutral consumers/workers, who supply labor inelastically. For simplicity, each
worker is endowed with h units of general skills to begin with. The level of general skills can be
endogenized if needed.
Workers￿preferences have two parts: Utility derived from consumption and disutility from skill
acquisition. Utility from consumption is a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate over consumption











Consumers exhibit love of variety. The real consumption index of sector s is a constant-elasticity
of substitution (CES) aggregate over consumption of all available varieties !0s from the set ￿s (to









where cs (!) represents consumption of variety ! in sector s. The elasticity of substitution between
6varieties, ￿, is assumed to be bigger than 1 to capture a higher degree of substitutability between
varieties within sectors than between sectors. For simplicity, ￿ is assumed to be the same across
sectors. The demand function of variety ! in sector s is therefore
cs (!) = Dsps (!)
￿￿
where ps (!) is its price, Ds = P￿￿1
s bsY captures the demand level for goods in sector s, with Y be-






If worker i exerts an e⁄ort level ei to acquire skills, she incurs e⁄ort costs ￿ei, measured in units
of the homogeneous good. Therefore, given the ideal price index P of consumption and income wi,





2.2 Production Technologies and Market Structure
Production of the homogeneous goods requires only general knowledge. Technology is linear, with
unit labor requirement of general skills equal 1. The product market of homogeneous goods is
perfectly competitive, implying zero pro￿ts for the numØraire sector, and the wage of an employee
equal to her level of general skills.
The markets for di⁄erentiated products are monopolistically competitive. A potential employer
chooses a sector to enter and sets up a ￿rm with no cost. The main conclusions of the paper are
independent of the assumption of zero ￿xed costs.
The production function of a ￿rm in sector s is
ys = ￿fs (a)l, (1)
where l is ￿rm employment, ￿ is an exogenous ￿rm-speci￿c productivity, which will be explained
in detail below. The ￿rm￿ s endogenous labor productivity is
fs (a) = a￿sh
(1￿￿s)
,
where h stands for the ￿xed level of general skills acquired by workers before being matched with a
￿rm; a represents the average level of workers￿￿rm-speci￿c skills acquired on the job. ￿s is constant
for all ￿rms in the same sector. ￿s 2 (0;1) is increasing in the sector index s, such that ￿s > ￿s0 if
s > s0 8s;s0 2 f1;::;Sg.
After setting up the ￿rm, the employer hires workers by posting a contractible wage, w1. Since
there is a large number of ex-ante identical workers competing for jobs, w1 adjusts across ￿rms
9The assumption that disutility of e⁄ort is measured in the same units of nominal wages is implicitly made in the
Shapiro-Stiglitz (1984) e¢ ciency wage model, and more recently in Davis and Harrigan (2007).
7and sectors, ensuring identical expected wages for all workers at the time of hiring, independent of
which ￿rms and sectors they join.
During ￿rms￿hiring, workers have two choices: join one of the di⁄erentiated-good ￿rms, or
stay out in the external labor market. If they choose to stay out, they expect to be employed
by the homogeneous-good sector later. A worker who joins a di⁄erentiated-good ￿rm receives
w1 and expects to exert e⁄ort to acquire speci￿c skills. In practice, a lot of the ￿rm-speci￿c
skills are di¢ cult, if not impossible, to specify in contracts, and therefore cannot be veri￿ed by a
third party. For this reason, investments in ￿rm-speci￿c skills are assumed to be observable but
not contractible.10 I take the assumption of contract incompleteness as a fact of life, and do not
complicate the model by discussing its underpinnings. Furthermore, to focus on the main argument
of the paper, I also assume the same degree of contract incompleteness across sectors. Relaxing
this assumption does not a⁄ect the main conclusions of the model.
Because no enforceable contract can be written ex ante, the employer cannot impose her pre-
ferred level of investments on her employees. Under these circumstances, the employer and the
workers bargain over the division of surplus after workers invest in speci￿c skills. I adopt gener-
alized Nash bargaining between the representative worker (e.g. a union leader) and the employer
within the ￿right-to-manage" framework, with a given ￿ 2 (0;1) being the bargaining power of the
workers. In the ￿right-to-manage" framework, the two parties in the ￿rm bargain over wages, with
the level of employment being chosen unilaterally by the employer before the bargaining stage.11
To abstract from issues related to coordination and incentive problems among workers, I assume
that investment e⁄orts of all workers are chosen by a representative worker in the ￿rm. Developing
a model that features multilateral bargaining between individual workers and the employer, such as
those in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a and 1996b) and Acemoglu et al. (2007), can shed important light
on the incentive and coordination issues among workers. I opt for a simpler set-up with bilateral
bargaining to focus on the core of the paper ￿investment in ￿rm-speci￿c skills. This assumption can
be rationalized based on real-world bargaining between the employer and the union representative,
who represents the common interest of the union members in the ￿rm.12
After the investment costs are incurred by both parties, the employer and the employees of a
￿rm bargain over the division of expected surplus. At the time of bargaining, the employer￿ s outside
10For instance, contract incompleteness of human capital investment has been used as an explanation for ￿rm-
provided training in studies by Balmaceda (2005) and Casas-Arce (2006).
11As discussed in Stole and Zwiebel (1996a and 1996b), ￿rms have a strategic incentive to overemploy workers if
the technology has decreasing returns to scale. However, as noted in these papers, unions internalize this e⁄ect with
a single representative bargaining on other workers￿positions. Thus, no incentive for overemployment arises. This
statement is valid even if I relax the ￿right-to-manage" assumption.
12Allowing decentralized bargaining between a single worker and her employer would substantially complicate the
model. Along these lines, Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) employ the Shapley value concept
to solve for workers￿bargaining power in an incomplete-contract setting. They show that workers￿bargaining power
is higher in sectors with lower elasticities of substitution between varieties.
8option is normalized to 0.13 Without loss of generality, production itself is assumed to require no
e⁄ort by the workers. Concurrently, the homogeneous-good sector hires workers who remain in the
external labor market.14 A worker with h units of general skills in the di⁄erentiated-good ￿rm can
quit and supply labor in the competitive homogeneous-good sector. With the ability to produce h
units of homogeneous goods, each worker￿ s outside option at the time of bargaining is h:
2.3 Labor Regulations and Implied Workers￿Bargaining Power
Following Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004), I use the parameter for workers￿
bargaining power ￿, admittedly in an abstract fashion, to represent the degree of a country￿ s labor
protection in the model.15 A higher ￿ is associated with more protective (regulated) labor laws.
Intuitively, when labor laws become more protective, workers can bargain for a larger ex-post share
of surplus from the joint relationship. To mention a few real-world examples, ￿ can capture any
labor regulations that increase workers￿primitive bargaining power with respect to the employer,
ranging from the existence and the nature of extension agreements, to closed-shop arrangements and
rules on the right to strike (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003). To focus on cross-country di⁄erences in
labor laws, I assume identical bargaining power of workers across all ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated-good
sector in an economy.
t1 t3 t4
Employment and












Figure 1: Timing of Events
2.4 Timing of Events
The timing of events is summarized as follows (see also Figure 1). There is no discounting between
t1 and t4.
13A posssible interpretation is that workers have spent time acquired skills but did not produce anything yet at
the time of bargaining.
14The assumption that the homogeneous-good sector hires workers later than the di⁄erentiated-goods ￿rms is not
crucial for the main conclusions of the paper. Having this assumption allows me to highlight the ex-post relative
returns to both types of skills. If I assume instead that this sector employs workers at exactly the same time as the
di⁄erentiated-goods ￿rms, the solutions of w1 will be di⁄erent. Nevertheless, since ex-ante transfers do not a⁄ect
workers￿incentives to invest, the main insights of the model are unchanged.
15See also Gri¢ th et al. (2007) for a discussion.
9At t1, the ￿rm posts a contractible wage w1 to hire workers. Job seekers can either join a
di⁄erentiated-good ￿rm or stay out in the external labor market.
At t2, workers in di⁄erentiated-good ￿rms acquire speci￿c skills, in anticipation of a share ￿ of
the ex-post surplus from sales, together with the outside options that depend only on general skills.
At t3, after workers￿investments, agents in a di⁄erentiated-good ￿rm bargain over the division
of expected surplus. The homogeneous-good sector hires workers, pays each of them h. The labor
market clears.
At t4, if both parties in the ￿rm agreed to continue the relationship at t3, workers produce
goods using their acquired skills e⁄ortlessly. Ex-post surplus S from sales (revenue minus the
outside options of both parties) is divided between the employer and the employees, according
to labor laws, with ￿S and (1 ￿ ￿)S going to the workers and the employer, respectively. The
homogeneous-good sector produces and sells an amount hl0 of goods. All goods markets clear.
2.5 Firm-level Equilibrium
2.5.1 Preliminaries
I solve the model backward in time from t4. Given ￿rm exogenous productivity ￿, ￿rm outcomes are
all identical in symmetric equilibrium. Thus, in this section, I focus on a single ￿rm and suppress
both ￿rm (!) and sector (s) subscripts.
Given downward-sloping demand for each variety, the price and ￿rm revenue of a variety (as a
function of y) are expressed as follows:
p = D1￿￿y￿￿1; R = D1￿￿y￿, (2)
where ￿ = 1 ￿ 1=￿ < 1 and D is the demand level for goods in a given sector (to be solved in
equilibrium). Since each ￿rm is in￿nitesimal, D is taken as given by agents in each ￿rm.
With a worker￿ s outside option equal to h and that of the employer normalized to 0, the ex-post
surplus of a ￿rm with l workers is
S (a) = R(a) ￿ hl:
2.5.2 Workers￿Investment in Firm-speci￿c Skills (at t2)
Since investment in speci￿c skills are non-contractible, workers invest optimally at t2, anticipating
payo⁄s from ex-post bargaining at t3. Throughout the paper, I assume that ￿rms do not invest in
workers￿human capital.16
To simplify algebra, I assume that the marginal cost of skill acquisition ￿ equals 1. Since each
worker expects to obtain ￿S (a)=l + h ex post, the representative employee of the ￿rm maximizes
16They do, however, indirectly pay for them in equilibrium through ex-ante transfers.





￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)hl ￿ al
￿
.
With l chosen by the employer ex ante, the ￿rst order condition delivers the optimal investment














where B = (D=l)
1￿￿. Each worker expects to receive a smaller share of ￿rm revenue when the
￿rm gets bigger. Because the marginal revenue is decreasing in labor, all else being equal, workers
have less incentive to acquire skills in larger ￿rms. When workers anticipate a higher share of ￿rm
revenue ￿, they exert more e⁄ort to acquire speci￿c skills in the interest of their employer. With
incomplete contracting, there would be under-investments in speci￿c skills. Consider for a moment
that human capital investments are contractible, such that the employer can impose her preferred
levels of investments on the workers. The ￿rst-best investment level (ac) under complete contracting
would imply a￿=ac = ￿
￿
1￿￿￿ < 1.17 Thus, workers always underinvest from the perspective of the
employers when contracts are incomplete.18 Notice that the degree of underinvestment is increasing
in the intensity of speci￿c-skills in production (increasing in ￿).19
These e⁄ects of labor regulations on endogenous ￿rm productivity is summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 Let &￿ (￿;￿) ￿ @ lnf￿ (￿;￿)=@ ln￿ be the elasticity of f￿ (￿;￿) with respect to ￿, and
&￿ ￿ @ lnf￿ (￿;￿)=@ ln￿ be the elasticity of f￿ (￿;￿) with respect to ￿. I have that:
i) &￿ (￿;￿) > 0;
ii) @&￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ > 0 and @&￿ (￿;￿)=@￿ > 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
Part (i) of this lemma highlights that all else equal, higher bargaining power of workers enhances
labor productivity. In the current model in which workers are the only party investing in human
capital, workers￿anticipation of higher ex-post payo⁄s encourages speci￿c skill acquisition, which
in turn enhances ￿rm productivity.
17The ￿rst-best maximization problem for the workers is maxa R(a)=l ￿ a.
18This is a standard one-sided hold-up result, when workers are not the full residual claimants of the gains from
their investments. In reality, ￿ is never close to 1. Also, this simple model does not include capital as a factor
of production. With capital as a factor of production, an employer would require some surplus to cover her sunk
investment costs.
19The focus of this paper is on comparative advantage due to labor regulations. The current discussion about ￿
has no normative implications for optimal labor laws. For welfare analysis for countries under di⁄erent labor laws,
see a review by Nickell (1997).
11More importantly, part (ii) of the lemma captures the main determinant of institutional com-
parative advantage in the paper. Similar to Costinot (2009b), the second part of Lemma 1 speci￿es
that labor productivity f￿ (￿;￿) is log-supermodular in both arguments. In other words, the pos-
itive e⁄ect of granting workers bargaining power is larger for ￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive sectors,
which potentially mitigates the costs of employment protection. This insight is consistent with
Roberts and Van den Steen (2000), who postulate that it is optimal for an employer to grant her
employees a larger share of equity or role in governance when non-contractible human-capital are
more important for production.
The log-supermodularity of f￿ (￿;￿) provides general implications. Consider a world with two
countries: i and k, which are identical in all aspects beside that labor laws are more protective in
i than k, i.e. ￿i > ￿k. To show di⁄erent impacts of labor protection across sectors, consider the










This ratio is increasing in ￿ as long as ￿i > ￿k. Intuitively, through endogenous workers￿skill
acquisition, the model delivers an upward-sloping technology schedule (in ￿) that captures compar-
ative advantage of the two countries. This schedule is close in spirit to the exogenous technology
schedule in Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson￿ s (1977) two-country Ricardian trade model with a
continuum of industries.
At t3, since the Nash-bargaining outcomes are always e¢ cient, both parties agree to produce
jointly. At t4, workers produce goods e⁄ortlessly with the acquired skills.
2.5.3 Firm Employment Decision (t1)
Now let us go back to period t1. Anticipating a payo⁄ of (1 ￿ ￿) S (a￿) at t4, the employer hires
workers by o⁄ering a contractible wage, w1. The employer chooses the level of employment l to





At t1, the outside options for workers are determined by the (expected) employment opportu-
nities in the homogeneous-good sector. Since the wage of each unit of general skills equals 1, a
worker endowed with h units of general skills expects an ex post outside option of h. On the other
hand, joining a ￿rm with productivity ￿ gives her an up-front payment w1 (￿) plus expected future
payo⁄s equal to ￿R(a￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)h minus costs of investment. Hence, the ex-ante participation
constraint for a worker joining the ￿rm at t1 is
w1 (￿) + ￿R(a￿;￿)=l + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ a￿ ￿ h.
Inelastic supply of ex-ante identical workers implies that w1 (￿) will adjust until the participation
12constraint binds. w1 (￿) is then pinned down as
w1 (￿) = ￿￿
￿
R(a￿;￿)=l ￿ a￿ ￿ h
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)a￿:
A higher ￿ implies higher ex-post payo⁄s for the workers, and therefore lower ex-ante transfers to
the workers.20 The term inside the square brackets is negative because of the concavity of R(a￿;￿).
Workers are assumed to be not credit-constrained, so that a negative w1 (i.e., a positive transfer
from the workers to the employer) is feasible. Substituting w1 into the ￿rm￿ s objective function
yields21










With f￿ (￿;￿) solved in (3), I can solve for ￿rm price, output, revenue and the employer￿ s net
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These ￿rm values take the familiar functional forms. Because ￿ < 1, price is a standard mark-up
over marginal cost ￿(￿;￿)=￿. The ￿rm-speci￿c exogenous productivity ￿ is negatively correlated
with prices. Sector-level demand A and ￿rm-level productivity ￿ are positively related to ￿rm
output, revenue and employers￿net surplus. A higher ￿ induces workers to exert more e⁄ort for
skill acquisition, thus enhancing ￿rm productivity. These e⁄ects are stronger in sectors for which
￿rm-speci￿c skills are more important (see Appendix A for proofs).22 Notice that all ￿rm-level
20To show that shirking is never an equilibrium outcome, consider the situation when a worker shirks, and invest
in no skills at all. The expected ￿life-time" income of a shirker is equal to w1 plus her outside option at t3, which
will become h, i.e. Ushirk =
￿
w1 (￿) + h
￿
=P. For a worker who exerts optimal e⁄orts to acquire skills, she will
get Uopt: =
￿
w1 (￿) + ￿R(a
￿;h
￿;￿)=l + (1 ￿ ￿)h ￿ a
￿￿
=P. Since R(a
￿;￿) exhibits decreasing returns to scale with
respect to a, the optimal choice of a
￿ guarantees that R(a
￿;￿) ￿ a
￿ > 0. Thus, Uopt: ￿ Ushirk and shirking is always
an o⁄-equilibrium outcome.
21One may wonder that since the employer￿ s ex-post surplus is decreasing with ￿, all else being equal, the employer
should be worse o⁄ when the workers gain more bargaining power. However, with a constant ex-ante outside option h
for the workers, ex-ante transfers to the workers w1 (￿) adjust in such a way so that all workers across ￿rms and sectors
receive the same ￿life-time" income. Hence, when a higher ￿ increases investments in speci￿c skills and therefore
joint surplus, the employer￿ s net surplus increases one for one.
22Notice that the timing of the game is crucial for the results here. Since workers acquire speci￿c skills after they
receive the transfers, the amount of the transfers no longer matters for their investment incentives. Therefore, even
though the employer￿ s net surplus increases one for one, workers￿incentives to invest does not decrease. In fact,
13variables are independent of the level of general skills h.23
In this model, workers invest only in ￿rm-speci￿c skills but not general skills. However, the
model is general enough to incorporate non-contractible investment activities for both types of
skills. The solutions to this extended model posit that higher workers￿bargaining power alleviates
the underinvestment problems for all human capital investments, more so for production that
depends more on speci￿c skills. The rationale is that since speci￿c skills are not transferable across
￿rms, the associated underinvestment problem is relatively more severe. If protective labor laws
can alleviate the underinvestment problems for both types of skills, the e⁄ect would be greater
for speci￿c human-capital investments and for production that depends more on them. Since the
extension does not change the main insights about comparative advantage, a simpler model is
presented here.
3 The Multi-Country Open-Economy Model
In this section, I embed the closed-economy model in a multi-country open-economy framework, ￿
la Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The ultimate goal of this section is to derive sector-level
gravity equations, which capture the impact of labor market institutions on both the intensive
and extensive margins of trade. In the main text, I present only the partial-equilibrium version
of the model by taking the measure of ￿rms in each sector as given, following Helpman, Melitz
and Rubinstein (2008) and Manova (2010). Readers are referred to the appendix for a general-
equilibrium analysis of the model, similar to Chaney (2008).
3.1 The Environment
Consider an open economy with N countries. All goods are potentially traded across countries.
While the homogeneous (numØraire) goods are assumed to be freely traded, di⁄erentiated-good
￿rms face ￿xed and variable export costs. The variable cost takes the form of an ￿iceberg" trans-
portation cost ￿for a unit of a variety shipped from country i to country j, only a fraction 1=￿ij < 1
arrives in the destination. In addition, to export to country j, a ￿rm in country i has to pay an
up-front ￿xed cost fij in units of the numØraire.24 For simplicity, I assume symmetric variable and
￿xed trade costs between any two trade partners, i.e. ￿ij = ￿ji and fij = fji.
I consider only equilibria in which the numØraire good is produced in all countries.25 Given
that each worker is endowed with hi of general skills, all workers￿life-time incomes in country i
exactly the opposite happens: anticipating a larger share of ￿rm surplus, workers have more incentives to invest,
driving up the employer￿ s (expected) surplus by adjusting the ex-ante incentive-neutral transfers.
23It happens that h is multiplied to l in both the employers￿surplus and labor costs, which o⁄set each other in
these equations.
24Examples of the ￿xed export costs include costs for setting up a distribution network, research on the foreign
markets, and so on.
25This condition will hold as long as the expenditure share of the numØraire (1 ￿ ￿) is large enough, or trade costs
for di⁄erentiated goods are high enough.
14equal hi. To simplify notation, I denote country i0s nominal labor income by wi = hi.
To derive an empirical speci￿cation to test the extensive margin of trade, I introduce hetero-
geneous ￿rm productivity in the model, ￿ la Melitz (2003). Upon setting up a ￿rm, the employer
draws costlessly an exogenous productivity parameter ￿, which determines part of the ￿rm￿ s labor
productivity. Once ￿ is drawn, it becomes common knowledge at the time of hiring. As in Help-
man, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), ￿rms in di⁄erent sectors draw their ￿0s from a common Pareto
distribution over bounded support [1;￿H],26 with the cumulative distribution function of ￿ equal









, where ￿ is a measure of the dispersion of ￿0s across
￿rms. ￿ is assumed to be bigger than ￿ ￿ 1.27 A smaller ￿ represents a higher concentration of ￿0s
around the lower bound, which is normalized to 1.
3.2 Sectoral Export Thresholds for a Foreign Market
I de￿ne ￿is ￿ ￿(￿i;￿s); and the employer￿ s net surplus from exporting to j in sector s as e ￿ijs (￿) ￿













￿1￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿ fij,
where Yj is the aggregate spending of country j, Pjs is the price index of sector s in j, and ￿￿
ijs is
the productivity threshold above which ￿rms in i export to j (to be determined below). Evidently,
all else being equal, a ￿rm in i exports more to a larger market j (i.e., a higher PjsYj).
The employer￿ s net surplus depends on the term of endogenous comparative advantage due to
i￿ s labor laws ￿is. Firms in i would export to j if the expected net surplus is su¢ ciently large
to cover the ￿xed export cost fij. Thus, only a subset of ￿rms export. Formally, the break-even




















With the presence of ￿xed trade costs fij, there are increasing returns to exporting at the ￿rm
level. Therefore, ￿￿
ijs is increasing in fij; and is decreasing in Yj and Pjs. The impact of labor laws
on ￿￿
ijs is summarized by the following lemma.
26The assumption of Pareto distribution of exogenous productivity, orginally proposed by Melitz (2003), was
adopted by a series of papers, such as Chaney (2008), Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), among others. See
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) for evidence that the sample distributions of ￿rm size in the U.S. and Europe
are approximated closely by Pareto distribution.
27This assumption ensures that the distribution of ￿rm sales has a ￿nite mean in equilibrium.
15Lemma 2 (Firm Selection into Exporting): All else being equal, the productivity thresholds
for exporting are lower when labor laws become more protective; more so in sectors for which
￿rm-speci￿c skills are more important (higher ￿).
Proof: See Appendix
Ceteris paribus, this result comes from the fact that an employer￿ s net surplus e ￿ijs is increasing
in workers￿bargaining power ￿i, proportionally more so for the more ￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive
sectors.
Without ￿rm-level data for a large sample of countries, it is di¢ cult to test Lemma 2 empirically.
However, conditional on a measure Nis of ￿rms in country i and sector s, the fraction of ￿rms





< 1 with ￿￿
ijs 2 (1;￿H). In other words, at the country
level, Lemma 2 can be examined indirectly by exploring the likelihood of a country￿ s exporting to
another country, which is summarized by the following testable proposition.
Proposition 1 (Extensive Margin of Trade): For a country￿ s trade partners, those with more
protective labor laws are more likely to export in more ￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive sectors.
3.3 Sectoral Export Volume to a Foreign Market
By rewriting the demand level A in (5) in terms of the sectoral price (Pjs) and aggregate spending

















across all ￿rms exporting to j in sector s gives the sectoral volume







where Nis is the number of all ￿rms (including non-exporters) in sector s and country i. Following
Manova (2010), we assume an exogenous Nis. With ￿ following a Pareto distribution over a bounded
















The sectoral export volume Xijs is increasing in the number of producers, Nis, and the sectoral
price level of the importing country, Pjs. The latter relationship represents the competition e⁄ects
on export volume. All else equal, more would be exported to the less competitive foreign market.
16In sum, labor protection a⁄ects the sectoral volume of exports on both the intensive margin
and the extensive margin. First, higher ￿rm productivity due to higher incentives in acquiring
speci￿c skills are associated with lower prices, and thus higher ￿rm and sectoral export volumes
(the intensive margin). Second, for a given foreign market, a higher ￿i implies a larger fraction of
￿rms exporting. Since both margins imply a higher export volume, the combined e⁄ects of labor
laws on trade ￿ ows are summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 (Intensive Margin of Trade): For a country￿ s trade partners, those with more
protective labor laws export relatively more in more ￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive sectors.
Proof: see appendix.
The model can be closed in general equilibrium, under the assumptions made by Chaney (2008).
Detailed derivation of the results can be found in Appendix A. The sector-level gravity equation
derived in general equilibrium will then be used as the speci￿cation for traditional gravity estimation














where &s is a sector-speci￿c constant (see derivation in Appendix A).28 As in a standard gravity
equation, Xijs is decreasing in both variable and ￿xed trade costs, and is increasing in the product
of incomes of the trading partners. Importantly, the comparative statics of ￿ and ￿ for sector-
level exports derived in partial equilibrium, summarized in Proposition 2 in the previous section,
continue to hold.29
4 Econometric Speci￿cations
In the rest of the paper, I provide empirical evidence to examine the theoretical predictions about
both the intensive and extensive margins of trade. To this end, I follow Manova (2010) to implement
the two-stage procedure proposed by Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) to estimate the gravity
equation at the sector level. The ￿rst stage is a selection equation, based on the solution of ￿￿
ijs in
section 3.2, while the second stage is a bilateral trade ￿ ow equation, based on the solution of Xijs
in section 3.3. Implementing this procedure achieves two goals ￿to test the theoretical prediction
on the extensive margin of trade, and to structurally correct the potential biases in the traditional






















29However, with the assumption of ￿H ! 1, the prediction of the extensive margin of trade no longer holds. It is
important to note that this assumption is needed to close the model in general equilibrium. Empirical evidence for
the extensive margin of trade reported later in this paper requires ￿ distributed over a bounded support, regardless
of whether G(￿) is Pareto or not.
174.1 Empirical Speci￿cation for Two-Stage Estimation
There are two potential biases in the OLS estimation of the gravity equation based on equation
(10). The ￿rst bias is the Heckman (1979) sample selection bias. My sample shows that about
50% of the countries do not trade with each other in 1995.30 At the sector level, about 80% of
the observations have zero trade ￿ ows. This non-random selection induces a positive correlation
between the unobserved trade frictions and the observed ones.31 Hence, excluding the out-of-
sample zeros from the regression induces a downward bias (closer to 0) in the estimates of the
determinants of trade ￿ ows. To correct the selection bias, I include the inverse Mills￿ratio in the
second-stage equation, similar to the standard Heckman (1979) procedure. The inverse Mills￿ratio
is imputed using the predicted probability of exporting (by sector) from the ￿rst-stage estimation
(to be discussed below).
Furthermore, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) posit that with ￿rm heterogeneity, omit-
ting the ￿rm self-selection term as a control may lead to overestimation in the traditional estimates
of the gravity equation using OLS. To correct for this type of biases, I derive the empirical spec-
i￿cation for equation (8), under the assumption of stochastic ￿xed and variable trade costs (see
details in Appendix A):
lnXijs = ￿ + ￿Labori ￿ Specs + nis + ￿pjs + ￿s + ￿i + ￿j ￿ #dij + !ijs + uijs. (11)
where the explanatory variable of interest, Labori ￿ Specs interacts exporter i￿ s degree of labor
protection, Labori, with sector s￿ s ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity Specs. Proposition 2 predicts ￿ > 0.
With stochastic ￿xed and variable trade costs as speci￿ed in Appendix A, the speci￿cation includes
a sector ￿xed e⁄ect (￿s = lnbs in (8)), an exporting country ￿xed e⁄ect (￿i) and an importing
country ￿xed e⁄ect (￿j); dij ￿ lnDij is the (log) bilateral distance;32 ￿ is a constant and uijs is an
error term, which is assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors.
Notice that in (11), regressors also include the (log) number of ￿rms, nis = lnNis; in sector s
of the exporting country i, and the (log) sectoral price level, pjs ￿ lnPjs; in the importing country
j. The speci￿cation also includes !ijs. This captures the extensive margin of trade as well as the
composition of exporting ￿rms. Omitting it would result in an overestimation of all estimates in
the trade ￿ ow equation.33 For the purpose of correcting both types of biases, I follow Helpman
30It means that country i does not export to country j , or vice versa. This number is very close to what Helpman,
Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) ￿nd.
31With only positive trade ￿ ows included in the sample, countries with high observed trade costs that trade with
each other (e.g., long distance between the a pair of trading countries) are likely to have low unobserved trade
frictions.
32￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)ln￿; ￿i = lnwi, ￿j = lnYj
33As show in equation (7), !ijs is expressed as a function of the exporting productivity threshold ￿
￿
ijs, which
according to the model, is a increasing function in ￿xed exporting costs fij. Thus, a lower sectoral export volume
can be due to a lower export volume per ￿rm, or fewer exporting ￿rms, or both. Explicitly controlling for !ijs in
(12) ensures that uijs comes entirely from the unobserved part of the variable trade costs. Second, !ijs summarizes
the composition of exporting ￿rms to country j, which a⁄ects the magnitude of the estimated elasticities of trade
18Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) and implement a two-stage estimation procedure parametrically. I
brie￿ y outline the speci￿cation of the ￿rst-stage selection equation here. Readers are referred to
their original paper for a detailed discussion.
4.1.1 Firm Selection Into Exporting (Derivation of the First-stage Estimation)
To empirically examine the extensive margin of trade according to equation (9), I derive the econo-
metric speci￿cation for the ￿rst-stage regression as follows (see Appendix A for details):
￿ijs = Pr(Iijs = 1j observed variables.) (12)
= ￿
￿
￿￿ + ￿￿Labori ￿ Specs + ￿pjs + ￿￿
s + ￿￿
i + ￿￿
j ￿ #￿dij ￿ ’￿ ij
￿
,
where Iijs 2 f0;1g is an indicator variable, which equals 1 if trade ￿ ows are observed from i to j in
sector s, and 0 otherwise; ￿(:) is the c.d.f. of a unit-normal distribution. I estimate this selection
equation as a Probit model.
This Probit estimation serves two purposes. It provides evidence, if any, for the extensive
margin of trade. It also provides a regressor to control for the extensive margin of trade (!ijs) in
speci￿cation (11). In particular, I use predicted probabilities of exporting at the sector level b ￿ijs
from estimating (12) to estimate !ijs = lnWijs based on (9), which is then included as a regressor
in the second-stage estimation to correct the two biases. Appendix A has a detailed discussion on
how to consistently estimate !ijs using the ￿rst-stage estimates.
5 Data
5.1 Sector Proxies for Firm-speci￿c Skill Intensity
To examine the theoretical predictions, I construct sector proxies for ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity,
which to my knowledge have not been estimated before. To this end, I follow the labor economics
literature on tenure e⁄ects on wages (Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Topel, 1991; Altonji and Williams,
2005; Kambourov and Manovskii, 2009) and use returns to ￿rm tenure in the U.S. to gauge the
importance of ￿rm-speci￿c skills. A number of alternative theories can explain an upward-sloping
wage pro￿le due to ￿rm tenure, including among others, theories of incentive contracts to elicit
workers￿e⁄ort (Lazear, 1981), asymmetric information about workers￿abilities (Katz and Gibbons,
1991) and wage compression due to search frictions in labor markets (Acemoglu and Pischke,
1999). I abstract, however, from these theories and adopt instead the most common and original
explanation as the basis to construct my sector proxies for skill speci￿city.
Speci￿cally, I estimate Mincer wage equation and include the employee￿ s job tenure with her
current employer (and its squared). To capture di⁄erent returns to ￿rm tenure across sectors, I
￿ ows with respect to trade frictions and exporters￿labor protection. These two particular features of !ijs suggest
that including !ijs is essential for obtaining consistent estimates of the e⁄ects of institutions on trade ￿ ows.
19interact an individual￿ s job tenure with the dummy of the sector in which she is currently employed.
The theory of ￿rm-speci￿c human capital postulates a higher coe¢ cient on the interaction term for
a sector in which ￿rm-speci￿c skills are more important in production.











+￿1Work_Expkt + ￿2 (Work_Expkt)
2 + Contkmt + ￿kmst + "kmst.
where k, m, s and t stand for person, employer, sector and year, respectively; wkmst denotes the
real wage rate. Secs is a dummy for sector s. Firm_Tenkmt is the worker￿ s self-reported tenure
with the current employer.
I use the estimated coe¢ cients on Firm_Tenkmt and its squared term (￿1s;￿2s) to construct
the sector proxies for speci￿c skill intensity as:
SpecT
s = b ￿1s ￿ T + b ￿2s ￿ T2,
where SpecT
s is the predicted return to T years of ￿rm tenure (up to a squared term). It is worth
noting that the estimated b ￿2s￿ s are small, and the bilateral correlation between any two SpecT
s , 8
T 2 [1;10], is consistently higher than 95%. Importantly, the empirical results below are robust
to using di⁄erent SpecT
s estimated over di⁄erent time horizons. I choose T = 5 as the baseline to
construct the sector measures of speci￿city.
To account for the unexplained match-speci￿c productivity that a⁄ects the continuation of a
relationship, I include a continuation dummy, Contkmt, which equals 1 for tenure that exceeds one
year. I also control for workers￿labor-market experience, Work_Expit, (and its squared) to parse
out the e⁄ects of general (transferable) skills on wages.34 As in most wage equations, I include a
set of controls (￿kmst) in the regression according to (13), including education (and its squared), a
dummy for union membership, as well as sector, occupation (at the 1-digit level), state and year
￿xed e⁄ects.
Data on wages, employees￿tenure and other characteristics are taken from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) dataset for 20 waves over 1974-1993.35 I use U.S. as the reference country
for two reasons. First, it is the only country I have access to for estimating the tenure e⁄ects for a
large number of sectors. Second, according to the model, a ￿ exible labor market in the U.S. implies
lower investments in ￿rm-speci￿c skills for all sectors, compared to countries with more protective
34I also include interaction terms between Work_Expkt with SECs to partial out the wage e⁄ects of general skills,
which may di⁄er across sectors. The ranking of the estimated ￿rm tenure e⁄ects changes slightly, but the main results
of gravity estimation are very robust to using these alternative estimated tenure e⁄ects.
35I choose this sample period for data quality concerns.
20labor laws. To the extent that di⁄erent tenure e⁄ects are observed across sectors in the U.S., we
can expect even more pronounced di⁄erences across sectors in countries with more protective labor
laws. Therefore, as long as the rankings of these estimates are stable across countries, the predicted
results are identi￿able.36
Following the literature on the e⁄ects of seniority on wages, I use a PSID sample that includes
males who are heads of households, aged between 21 and 60 (inclusive), worked for at least 500 hours
in a year, and earned real hourly wages of at least $2 (in 1990 dollars). Furthermore, because trade
data for a large number of countries are only available for manufacturing sectors, I use observations
from only manufacturing sectors in the PSID sample to estimate tenure e⁄ects. I adopt the variable-
construction procedure proposed by Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) to improve data quality.
In particular, this procedure aims at making an individual￿ s self-reported values of tenure and
experience to be consistent across years (see Appendix B). All manufacturing sectors are included
in estimating the return to ￿rm tenure by sector. Although tenure e⁄ects (￿1s;￿2s) can potentially
be estimated for all manufacturing sectors, I discard the estimates of the sectors that have fewer
than 70 observations in the cleaned PSID sample (after applying the standard ￿lters mentioned
in Appendix B).37 With this cuto⁄, I obtain a list of 36 3-digit PSID-classi￿ed sector measures of
￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity (out of 76 sectors in total).38
Table 1 lists the estimates of 5-year returns to tenure of 36 sectors included in the regression
analyses. Among these 36 estimates, 23 of them are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 at the 5% signi￿-
cance level.39 The top three speci￿c skill-intensive sectors are Petroleum Re￿ning (291), Beverages
(208), and Cement, Concrete, Gypsum, and Plaster products (324, 327). For example, a worker
who stays with the same employer for ￿ve years in the ￿Beverages" sector would experience ap-
proximately 25 percent real wage growth on average due to tenure with the same the employer.
Since petroleum companies are oftentimes state-owned enterprises in many countries, with their
associated exports determined by a government￿ s strategic reasons rather than comparative advan-
tage, I will perform a battery of sensitivity analyses to ensure that the main results are not driven
by this sector. It is worth emphasizing in advance that excluding that sector does not a⁄ect the
main results of the paper.
36The approach of using sector measures constructed using U.S. data originates from Rajan and Zingales (1998). In
their study of the e⁄ects of countries￿￿nancial development on di⁄erential growth by sector, they use sector measures
of dependence on external ￿nance, which are constructed using data of U.S. publicly-listed ￿rms. Subsequent empirical
studies on comparative advantage have used the same approach. See Romalis (2003), Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007)
and Manova (2010), among others.
37The results are insensitive to small adjustments to this minimum observation requirement. I have decreased
the requirement to 60 and the main empirical results of the paper remain unchanged. However, once I decrease this
requirement signi￿cantly, say below 50, the main results will start being dominated by a few outliers of estimated
tenure, determined by a few individuals in the occupation.
38Under the original census classi￿cation, the PSID dataset contains data for 81 (3-digit) census manufacturing
sectors. However, ￿ve of them have no mapping to SIC codes, such as ￿Not speci￿ed electrical machinery, equipment,
and supplies."
39Estimates which are not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0 are very close to 0. I am aware that estimates of two
consecutive sectors in the ranking may not be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from each other. However, existing measures on
contract dependence, for example, are estimated using the averaging approach and may have the same problem.
21For the bottom 3 sectors (Ordnance; Glass and glass products; Radio, T.V. and communication
equipment), the average ￿rm-tenure e⁄ects are negative. There are at least two possible reasons
for this. First, since an individual￿ s working experience is controlled for in the regression, the
partial e⁄ects of ￿rm-speci￿c skills could be negative for sectors in which general skills account
for a substantial part of the real wage growth. In this situation, staying with the same ￿rm for
a longer time may reduce the accumulation of general skills and therefore wages. Second, if the
average nominal wage growth in a sector is lower than in￿ ation, the average real wage is decreasing
in that sector. Nevertheless, in the sample of 36 sectors, 33 of them show non-negative estimated
returns to ￿rm tenure. All estimates are normalized to range between 0 and 1 to be used in the
gravity estimation. Also listed in Table 1 are normalized measures for estimated returns to 5 and
10 years of ￿rm tenure, with and without experience e⁄ects controlled for.
One may be concerned about the validity of the empirical results based on a sample with about
half of the sectors dropped due to limited availability of the estimated sector proxies. Nevertheless,
the fact that a sector has su¢ cient observations to remain in the ￿nal sample implies that it is
a large industry, at least in the U.S. It turns out that the sectors included account for about 60
percent of global manufacturing trade ￿ ows in 1995, for both my sample (84 countries) and the
sample that includes exporters without labor market protection measures (184 countries).
5.2 Other Country-level and Sector-level Data
Industry-level data on bilateral exports in 1995 are adopted from Feenstra (2000) World Trade
Flows Dataset. I choose this year for its proximity to the time period for which labor regulation
indices and other country-level data are available. The main regression results remain signi￿cant if
I use data from other years in the 1990s.40 To unify the de￿nition of a sector, which varies across
data sources with di⁄erent industry classi￿cations, I de￿ne a sector as an SIC87 3-digit category.
Since Feenstra￿ s trade data are classi￿ed based on the SITC (rev.2) system, I ￿rst map each SITC
(4-digit) code into a unique SIC code using the concordance ￿le on Feenstra￿ s website.41 For SIC
codes that have multiple SITC codes mapped, I aggregate export values across SITC codes within
the same SIC category. Similarly, for other sector-level data under classi￿cations di⁄erent from
the SIC classi￿cation, I use publicly available concordance ￿les to convert the industry codes into
SIC codes. The sources of the concordance ￿les and the mapping algorithms between di⁄erent
classi￿cation are discussed in detail in Appendix B. The original SIC87 3-digit classi￿cation has
140 sectors. However, using the concordance ￿le from Feenstra￿ s website, 118 SIC87 3-digit sectors
su¢ ce to cover all observations in the trade dataset. The availability of speci￿c skill intensity
proxies reduces the number of sectors from 118 to 62.
40Results are available upon request.
41Concordance ￿le: http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/usixd/wp5515d.html
Since there are more SITC categories than SIC categories, I allow multiple mapping from SITC to SIC, but not
vice versa.
22Data on labor regulations for 84 countries are taken from Botero et al. (2004).42 Based on
countries￿legal documents from the late 1990s, the authors codify the degree of regulations of
labor markets on employment, collective relations and social security. Using principal component
analysis, I compute the weighted average of the two main indices in their paper ￿￿Employment
Laws" index and ￿Collective Relations" index. The ￿Employment Laws" index represents costs
associated with ￿ring and employment contract adjustment. Speci￿cally, it is an unweighted average
of four subindices: (i) alternative employment contracts, (ii) costs of increasing hours worked, (iii)
cost of ￿ring workers, (iv) dismissal procedures. The ￿Collective Relations" index is an unweighted
average of two subindices: (i) labor union power and (ii) collective disputes. A higher index implies
more stringent labor laws. Table 2 lists the countries￿indices of labor law protection in the sample.
The two countries with the most protective labor laws (according to the average of the two indices)
are Kazakhstan (1.000) and Portugal (0.985), while the two countries with the most ￿ exible labor
regulations are Nigeria (0.023) and Malaysia (0.000).
To estimate the gravity equation, I obtain bilateral ￿trade costs" variables from di⁄erent sources.
The ￿rst source is a data set from the Centre d￿ Etudes Prospectives et d￿ Informations Interna-
tionales (CEPII), which contains information on geographical variables and colonial relationships.
For missing data, I refer to Glick and Rose (2002) and CIA World Factbook to augment the CEPII
data. Second, I obtain information on whether two countries are signatories of a regional trade
agreement (RTA) from the websites of WTO and various regional trade blocs. Finally, I obtain
information for whether two countries share a common legal origin from Botero et al. (2004).
See Appendix B for more details of these variables, as well as other country-level and sector-level
variables used in the empirical analysis.
The ￿nal sample contains 84 countries and 62 SIC 3-digit sectors, which captures about 58% of
global manufacturing exports in 1995, including the out-of-sample countries and sectors.
6 Results
6.1 Cross-country Correlation between Labor Protection and Industrial Spe-
cialization
Before examining the e⁄ects of labor laws on export patterns based on the framework developed
in section 4, I ￿rst present reduced-form cross-country evidence to verify whether countries with
protective labor laws have their exports biased toward more speci￿c skill-intensive sectors. To this









42The Botero et al. (2004) dataset contains 85 countries. Here, I do not include Taiwan in my sample, as trade
costs data for Taiwan are not available.
23where i and s stand for exporting country and sector, respectively. Xis is the value of i￿ s exports
(in US 2000 dollars) to the rest of the world in s, Xi is i￿ s total exports. Specs is the measure of
￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity for sector s, an estimate from estimating (13).
The model predicts a positive relationship between XSpeci and workers￿bargaining power in
country i. As is mentioned in the introduction, Figure 2 suggests a strongly positive correlation
between XSpeci and countries￿degree of labor market protection for the sample countries in 1995.
Notice that both developed and developing countries are well represented on both ends of the
distribution of the labor protection indices. Controlling for exporting countries￿factor abundance
(capital, human capital and natural resources) strengthens the correlation (Figure 3). The positive
relationship is observed among the OECD countries (members by the 90s), after factoring out the
e⁄ects of relative factor abundance (Figure 4).
These ￿gures mask important cross-country heterogeneity. To provide evidence more system-
atically about the proposed comparative advantage, I estimate the following equation
lnXis = ￿i + ￿s + ￿Labori ￿ Specs + Zihs￿ + eis, (15)
where i and s stand for country and sector, respectively. lnXis is (log) country i￿ s exports in
sector s to the rest of the world; Labori is i￿ s index of labor protection; Zi is a vector of country
characteristics, such as physical and human capital endowments, while hs is a vector of sector
characteristics, such as physical and human capital intensities. The interaction terms Zih are
included to control for countries￿characteristics besides labor market institutions that a⁄ect their
comparative advantages; eis is the error term; ￿i and ￿s represent country and sector ￿xed e⁄ects.
The functional form of the speci￿cation is identical to the baseline speci￿cation in Nunn (2007).
Table 3 presents the results from estimating (15). Standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported,
so that the magnitude of the coe¢ cients can be interpreted in terms of standard-deviation units.
Without controlling for other sources of comparative advantage, column (1) reports results that
countries with more protective labor laws export relatively more to the rest of the world in speci￿c-
skill intensive sectors, consistent with the channel of comparative advantage proposed in the model.
The coe¢ cient on Labori ￿Specs is positive and signi￿cant at the 5 percent level. Speci￿cally, one
standard deviation increase in Labori ￿Specs is associated with a 0.08 standard-deviation increase
in lnXis. In columns (2) to (3), I control for the Heckscher-Ohlin determinants of comparative
advantage by including the interaction terms between a country￿ s factor endowment and a sector￿ s
factor intensity. Adding interaction terms for physical, human capital and natural resources does
not a⁄ect the signi￿cance of the coe¢ cient on Labori￿Spec. Notice that the sample size decreases
substantially when factor endowment controls are included. Following Nunn (2007), in column (4),
I add an interaction term between a country￿ s (log) per capita GDP and the a sector￿ s value-added
share, as well as an interaction between a country￿ s per capita income and the sectoral annualized
24growth rate in the U.S.43 The coe¢ cient on the labor market interaction term remains signi￿cant
and similar in magnitude.
Recent research argues that industrial specialization due to international trade may in turn a⁄ect
institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Do and Levchenko, 2007). To address this potential reverse
causality, I use legal origins (British, French, German, Scandinavian legal origins) as instruments
for labor protection, and estimate (15) using 2SLS.44 Botero et al. (2004) also use legal origins as
instruments for countries￿labor market institutions to study the impact of labor protection on labor
market outcomes.45 The estimates in the second stage of the 2SLS estimation, as shown in Panel
B, become more signi￿cant, both statistically and economically. Although a country￿ s legal origin
can be used to isolate countries￿variation in labor market institutions una⁄ected by trade ￿ ows,
they may also a⁄ect specialization through other channels, such as contracting institutions, as has
been postulated by Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007) and Costinot (2009a). One should therefore
interpret the stronger 2SLS results here with caution, and notice that the legal origin of a country
may not satisfy the exclusion restriction criteria for a valid instrument.46 In the following gravity
estimation, I do not use legal origins as instruments, even though such 2SLS regressions often yield
more statistically signi￿cant results (in unreported results).
In addition to the factor endowment interactions added in the previous table, in Table 4, I
add more interaction terms between sectoral ￿rm speci￿city and various country characteristics,
including factor endowments and per capita GDP. In addition, recent studies have shown that
a country￿ s contracting institution is an important determinant of trade patterns. In my model,
investments in speci￿c skills are assumed to be completely non-contractible. One can argue that
if these investments are partially contractible, with the degree of contractibility of investments
a⁄ecting workers￿investment decisions, not controlling for a country￿ s contracting institutions would
result in biased estimation of the e⁄ects of labor market institutions. To this end, I add an
interaction term between country i￿ s judicial quality and sector s￿ s speci￿c skill intensity in column
(5). In short, controlling for interactions with di⁄erent country characteristics, the coe¢ cient on
Labori ￿ Specs remains signi￿cant and similar in magnitude across speci￿cations.
6.2 The Impact of Labor Laws on Export Volume
In this section, I test whether labor protection a⁄ects countries￿intensive and extensive margins
of trade by estimating sector-level gravity equations. The baseline results for testing the intensive
margin are based on traditional gravity estimation using OLS. After presenting the OLS results, I
implement the two-stage estimation procedure as speci￿ed in (11) and (12) above.
43Appendix B describes these variables in detail.
44The Socialist legal origin is the comparison group.
45In unreported results, I ￿nd that legal origins strongly predict labor law rigidity in the ￿rst stage of the 2SLS
estimation, with an R
2 equal to 0.43.
46Nunn (2007) also uses legal origins as instruments for contracting institutions, and ￿nd more signi￿cant 2SLS
estimates than the OLS estimates. He also discusses that these instruments may not satisfy the exclusion restritcions.
25Each observation in the sample represents a bilateral trade relationship in each sector. The
sample includes 958272 potential bilateral relationships (84 exporting countries ￿ 184 importing
countries ￿ 62 sectors). In my sample, about half of the countries do not trade with each other in
1995. This is consistent with what Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) ￿nd for their sample in
the 1980￿ s. At the sector level, about 88% of the potential trade relationships are zeros, rendering
the need to handle the extensive margin of trade carefully.47
First, I estimate (11) using OLS. In column (1) of Table 5, I regress (log) export volume
from i to j in sector s (lnXijs) on the interaction term between i￿ s labor protection and s￿ s ￿rm-
speci￿c skill intensity Labori ￿ Specs. I ￿nd a positive point estimate on the interaction term
(b ￿ = 0:759; t ￿ stat = 7:79), supporting Proposition 2. As speci￿ed in (11), included in the
regression are exporter, importer and sector ￿xed e⁄ects. Moreover, I always cluster standard
errors by importer-exporter pair to account for the correlation between unobserved trade barriers
(uijs and ￿ijs) common across sectors for each country pair.
To control for observable trade costs and distances that may a⁄ect the revealed pattern of trade,
I include nine ￿trade costs" variables between two trading partners in the regression. Consistent
with the traditional gravity estimates, the estimated coe¢ cients on these ￿trade costs" variables
show that two countries trade relatively more with each other if (i) they are closer to each other, (ii)
have ever been in a colonial relationship, (iii) have majority of the populations speaking a common
language, (iv) share a common border, (v) share the same legal origin and (vi) belong to the same
currency union. The estimates on the dummies for whether one of the countries is landlocked and
whether one of the countries is an island are insigni￿cant. Two land-locked countries appear to
trade more between themselves, contrasting the existing ￿ndings. Unless speci￿ed otherwise, this
entire set of ￿trade costs" will be controlled for in the rest of the gravity estimation.
The sectoral volume of exports depends on the competitiveness in the sector of the importing
country, which according to (11), is captured by pjs (ln(Pjs)). Without the measures of sectoral
prices for a large number of countries, I use the interaction term between the consumption price level
(relative to the U.S.) of country j and the dummy for sector s to proxy for pjs, following Manova
(2010). In column (2), I re-run the regression of column (1) by including these interactions. The
baseline estimates remain robust.
In addition to all regressors included in column (2), column (3) takes into account the Heckscher-
Ohlin determinants of comparative advantage by including interactions between countries￿factor
endowments and sectors￿factor intensities. Controlling for the e⁄ects of per capita endowments
of capital and human capital on export volumes, labor market institutions remain a signi￿cant
determinant of comparative advantage. Additionally, column (4) controls for the e⁄ects of natural
resource endowment on trade ￿ ows.
47Manova (2010) ￿nds that 75% of potential trade ￿ ows being 0 at a more aggregated industry level (28 ISIC
sectors).
26The e⁄ect of labor regulations is economically signi￿cant. For example, if the U.S., the country
at the 10th percentile of the distribution of labor protection, adopts the set of labor laws of Germany,
the country at the 90th percentile, the gap between the average unilateral export volume of o¢ ce
furniture (75th percentile in terms of ￿rm speci￿city of skills) and that of ship and boat building
and repairing (25th percentile in terms of ￿rm speci￿city of skills) would increase by about 15
percentage points.48
According to (11), the sectoral volume of exports also depends positively on the number of
producers in the exporting country. In light of this, I include the (log) number of ￿rms in the
exporter￿ s sector as a control (column (5)).49 The baseline estimates again remain statistically
signi￿cant. In column (6), standardized beta coe¢ cients are reported for the same regression of
column (5). As can been seen, a standard deviation increase in Labori ￿ Specs is associated with
a 0.08 standard deviation increase in the sectoral export value. The magnitude of the coe¢ cient is
very close to that from the reduced-form regressions reported in Table 3. Taken at face value, the
magnitude is about one-￿fth of that associated with comparative advantage due to human capital
endowment.
6.3 First-stage Estimation of the Extensive Margin of Trade
Next I present the empirical results of the two-stage estimation outlined in section 4. In particular,
I disentangle the impacts of labor market institutions on trade patterns into that for ￿rm selection
into exporting, and that for export volumes.
Proposition 2 posits that countries with more protective labor laws are more likely to export
in speci￿c skill-intensive sectors. I test this proposition by estimating its empirical counterpart,
formulated as a Probit equation in (12). The dependent variable is an indicator which is equal to
1 if positive trade ￿ ows are observed from i to j in s, and 0 otherwise.
I use a Probit model to estimate (12). Exporter, importer, sector ￿xed e⁄ects and proxies for
sectoral prices in the importing country are always included. In addition to testing the extensive
margin, I use the predicted probability based on this estimation to construct measures to correct
for the two biases discussed in Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008). Variables that satisfy the
exclusion restriction criteria, which are required to correct for the standard Heckman selection, are
needed. Thus, in addition to the nine ￿trade costs" variables included in the gravity estimation
above, I include two additional trade barrier variables in the regressions ￿the number of procedures
48This comparative statics exercise is based on the estimates in column (4). Formally, this ￿di⁄-in-di⁄" result















b ￿ ’ 1:001, The di⁄erence in the indices of labor protection between Germany and the U.S. is 4Labor
i0
i = 0:858￿0:102,
and the di⁄erence in speci￿city between the two industries is 4Specs ’ 0:502 ￿ 0:319. Notice that this ￿di⁄-in-di⁄"
exercise has no prediction on the direction of the change in exports of either sector.
49The measure for the number of ￿rms per sector in 1995 is from UNIDO (2005) dataset, which is disaggregated
only at the ISIC 3-digit industry level (28 industries).
27and the number of days required to legally start a business in both importing and exporting
countries. These two measures are from Djankov et al. (2002) for a subset of the exporting countries
in my sample. Without measures of ￿xed trade costs, they are used as proxies for legal barriers
that deter any cross-border transactions. These two entry cost variables are included as regressors
in the ￿rst-stage equation, but will be excluded in the second-stage gravity estimation, in the belief
that they only a⁄ect countries￿participation in exports, but not the export volume conditional on
positive exports. In other words, lower entry costs in either the importing or exporting country
increase the chance of ￿rms￿selection into export markets, and thus increase the likelihood of
trade between the two countries. But once the hurdle is overcome and a trade relationship is
established, these start-up costs do not impair trade ￿ ows. Averages of these two variables between
the importing and exporting countries are used, similar to Manova (2010), assuming that ￿rm entry
costs a⁄ect domestic and foreign exporting ￿rms symmetrically.50
Table 6 presents the results of the ￿rst-stage Probit estimation. The speci￿cations are parallel
to those in Table 5 in terms of the set of regressors included. Most of the estimated coe¢ cients
on ￿trade costs" variables have the same signs as those reported in Table 5 (although not always
signi￿cant). Importantly, the estimates across all four speci￿cations show that countries with more
protective labor laws are more likely to export to another country in speci￿c skill-intensive sectors.
These ￿ndings support Proposition 2, and are robust to the inclusion of variables for the traditional
sources of comparative advantage.
Based on the model, a higher probability of exporting is a direct result of a larger fraction of
existing ￿rms self-selecting into export markets. Therefore, as mentioned in Helpman, Melitz and
Rubinstein (2008), even without ￿rm-level data, Lemma 2 can be veri￿ed based on the empirical
results at the country-sector level. In other words, the results in Table 6 can be interpreted as
follows: relatively more ￿rms self-select into exporting in the speci￿c skill-intensive sectors in
countries where labor laws are more protective.
6.4 Second-stage Estimation of the Trade Flow Equation
Using the predicted probabilities obtained from the Probit estimation, I correct both types of biases
in the OLS estimation as discussed in section 4, and examine whether labor regulations continue to
a⁄ect the pattern of trade ￿ ows. I estimate the second-stage trade ￿ ow equation (12) controlling
for the e⁄ects of ￿rm self-selection into exporting. Brie￿ y speaking, to correct for the bias due to
this unobserved ￿rm heterogeneity, I include an estimate of !ijs as a regressor. As discussed in




























, and b ￿ijs is the predicted probability of exporting (by
sector) from estimating ￿rst-stage equation. Additionally, to correct the Heckman selection bias, I
50Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) use dummy variables, which are set equal to one if both the importing
and the exporting countries have business start-up costs (e.g. days to start a business) that are higher than the
median in the sample.
28include the inverse Mills￿ratio b e
￿
ijs as a stand-alone regressor. Because b !ijs is a non-linear function
of b z￿
ijs and b e
￿
ijs, I estimate (11) using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).
Table 7 presents the results of the second-stage MLE estimation. With all regressors from the
￿rst-stage beside the two ￿entry cost" variables included, the interaction term for labor protection
remains positive and signi￿cant for all speci￿cations. This result is robust to the inclusion of the
interactions for the Heckscher-Ohlin sources of comparative advantage. Notice that the coe¢ cients
should not be compared directly with their OLS counterparts in Table 5, as only a subset of
countries have data on entry costs from Djankov et al. (2002). In column (6), I report the OLS
estimates for the results that correspond to column (5), using the same sample. As is shown, the
OLS point estimates are larger than the MLE estimates, suggesting that the upward bias arising
from omitting the extensive margin of trade dominates the Heckman selection bias in the OLS
estimates. This ￿nding is consistent with Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).
To check the robustness of the MLE results, I relax the Pareto distribution assumption of ￿rm
productivity, as well as the joint normality assumption of the unobserved ￿xed and variable trade
costs (uijs and ￿ijs). To correct the two sources of biases, I ￿rst assign the predicted probability
b ￿ijs￿ s of exporting into 50 bins, each having the same number of observations. Then I replace b !ijs
and b e
￿
ijs by these 50 dummies, and estimate the second-stage gravity equation again. The results
estimated using OLS are presented in Panel B of Table 6. They largely con￿rm the MLE results
in Panel A.
6.5 Robustness
To check the robustness of the gravity estimation, I re-run the regression of column (4) in Table
7 using various subsamples of exporting countries.51 The results for the sensitivity analyses are
reported in Table 8. First, I separate the sample into OECD (column (1)) and non-OECD (column
(2)) exporters. The coe¢ cient on Labori￿Specs is signi￿cant in both samples, but is quantitatively
larger for the non-OECD one. Given that petroleum re￿ning is the most ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensive
sector according to my estimation, one can be concerned about my results being driven by the
large oil exporting countries, for which comparative advantage may not be the main force shaping
trade patterns. To tackle this issue, we exclude exporting countries that have more than half of the
total exports coming from the ￿petroleum re￿ning exports" sector (column (3)). In column (4),
I simply exclude the sector of petroleum re￿ning. Excluding oil exporting countries or the entire
petroleum-re￿ning industry from the sample does not a⁄ect the signi￿cance of the results. Finally,
51I use this speci￿cation instead of the one in column (5) because of concerns of potential collinearity between
institutions and the number of ￿rms in a given exporting country. For example, better contracting institutions are
often associated with lower business costs, which encourage entrepreneurship, and therefore increase the number of
￿rms in a given country. Moreover, this e⁄ect is probably di⁄erent across sectors with di⁄erent degrees of contract
dependence, ￿xed costs of entry, and so on. It is noted that the results become even stronger after the inclusion of
the number of variables as a control. In unreported results, when the (log) number of ￿rms by sector is added as a
regressor, the estimated coe¢ cient on Labor ￿ Spec becomes even more robust.
29to ensure that my results are not driven by a few outlier industries, I drop the top two and the
bottom two ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensive sectors from the regression. As expected, the coe¢ cient on
Labori ￿ Specs decreases in size, but remains signi￿cant.
In Table 9, I check whether the baseline results are driven by alternative hypotheses proposed
in the existing literature on institutional comparative advantage. First, one may claim that since
uncertainty of ￿rm performance would deter workers￿ex-ante investments in ￿rm-speci￿c skills, the
sector measure of ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity may be highly correlated with sales volatility. If this is
the case, the results reported so far simply support the ￿ndings by Cuæat and Melitz (2010a), who
show both theoretically and empirically that countries with ￿ exible (rigid) labor markets specialize
in volatile (stable) sectors. First, notice that the bilateral correlation between sales volatility and
speci￿c skill intensity in my sample is only ￿0:06 (see Table A2 in the appendix). To address
the problem more formally, I estimate the speci￿cation for column (4) in Table 7 by adding an
interaction between a country￿ s labor protection and sectoral sales volatility. The results in column
(1) support the Cuæat-Melitz prediction: countries with more protective labor laws tend to export
less in the sectors that exhibit higher sales uncertainty.
In column (2), I use gross job ￿ ow rates in the U.S. at the sector level from Davis, Haltiwanger
and Schuh (1996) as a measure for sectoral volatility. The measure captures the degree of instability
of employer-employee relationships across sectors. The coe¢ cient on the interaction with gross job
￿ ows is negative and signi￿cant, providing another piece of supporting evidence for Cuæat and
Melitz (2010a). Importantly, sectoral di⁄erences in speci￿c skill intensity remain an independent
and important channel through which labor laws shape trade patterns.
Next, I examine whether cross-country di⁄erences in contracting institutions a⁄ect the main
results. As discussed in the model, another important source of comparative advantage regarding
￿rm-speci￿c investments is the quality of domestic contracting institutions. In the present con-
text, the underinvestment problem becomes less severe if contracts are more complete, potentially
through better contract enforcement. Furthermore, recent literature on institutional comparative
advantage shows that countries with better contracting institutions specialize in sectors that rely
more on e⁄ective contract enforcement (Levchenko, 2007; Nunn, 2007). I control for this type of
comparative advantage by including an interaction between the country￿ s quality of judicial system
and the sector￿ s dependence on contract enforcement, which is the same interaction term used by
Nunn (2007). Speci￿cally, a sector￿ s dependence on contract enforcement is proxied by the inverse
of the market thickness of the upstream supplier industries. Using this sector measure, I ￿nd sup-
porting evidence for the existing literature on contract enforcement and trade. Importantly, the
argument that labor market institutions are an important source of comparative advantage remains
robust.
In the last column of Table 9, I report standardized beta coe¢ cients to compare economic
signi￿cance of di⁄erent institutional channels of comparative advantage. A one standard-deviation
30increase in the labor law interaction is associated with a 0.06 standard deviation increase in (log)
export volume. While it seems small, its impact is non-negligible. As a comparison, the beta
coe¢ cient on the labor-law-job-￿ ow interaction is -0.07, while that on the legal-contract interaction
is 0.12 (column (6)).52
After examining the e⁄ects of other sources of institutional comparative advantage, I verify the
robustness of the results by sequentially isolating the e⁄ects of other country characteristics on
the trade patterns. In Table 10, I interact speci￿c skill intensity with di⁄erent exporting country
characteristics, and include the interaction terms as controls. The country characteristics that
I consider include: (1) log GDP per capita; (2) human capital endowment; (3) physical capital
endowment; (4) quality of the judicial system; (5) the level of ￿nancial development. Moreover,
all regressions in Table 10 already control for the interactions for the Heckscher-Ohlin sources of
comparative advantage. With all these country control interactions included, the coe¢ cient on the
labor protection interaction remains positive and signi￿cant,
Finally, to con￿rm that ￿rm speci￿c skill intensity is a crucial sectoral channel through which
labor market institutions shape trade patterns, and is independent from the e⁄ects of other sectoral
characteristics, I interact the labor protection index with various sector measures. The sector-level
attributes that are considered include: (1) the sector￿ s share of total manufacturing value added; (2)
skill intensity; (3) capital intensity; (4) the dependence on contract enforcement; (5) dependence on
external ￿nance and (6) total factor productivity growth rate. All these measures are constructed
using U.S. manufacturing ￿rms over the 1990s. Details about these sector measures can be found
in Appendix B. As Table 11 shows, controlling for the standard determinants of trade patterns, the
type of comparative advantage proposed in this paper remains robust.
7 Conclusion
This paper identi￿es a new source of comparative advantage arising from the interaction between
workers￿investments in ￿rm-speci￿c skills and a country￿ s labor regulations. Importantly, I show
that this endogenous channel of comparative advantage is independent of the previously examined
sectoral channel through which labor market institutions a⁄ect trade patterns.
I develop a simple model to show that workers have increased incentive to acquire ￿rm-speci￿c
skills relative to general skills in more protective labor markets. By embedding this model in a
multi-sector open-economy framework, I show that countries where labor laws are more protective
specialize in ￿rm-speci￿c skill-intensive sectors. In particular, for a given importer, countries with
more protective labor laws export relatively more, and are more likely to export in industries for
which ￿rm-speci￿c skills are more important.
52Chor (2010) ￿nds the same order of magnitude of the beta coe¢ cients on these institutional comparative advan-
tage interactions.
31By estimating sector-level gravity equations over a sample of 84 countries, I ￿nd supporting
evidence for the theoretical predictions. The empirical results are robust to the correction of the
biases arising from countries￿selection into trade partners, and ￿rm self-selection into exporting.
Importantly, the empirical ￿ndings are independent of other sources of comparative advantage,
including factor endowments, income and contracting institutions.
Future research includes constructing sector measures for speci￿c skill intensity using data from
other countries, and extending the model in a dynamic framework to study labor market dynamics.
A dynamic model would shed light on the e⁄ects of labor laws on workers￿on-the-job and o⁄-the-
job investment decisions, which in turn a⁄ect trade patterns. It is also important to examine how
trade openness, by a⁄ecting workers￿skill acquisition, may reinforce persistent di⁄erences in labor
market institutions across countries.
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38A Proofs and Derivation
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Recall from the text that
1. &￿ ￿ @ lnf￿(￿;￿)=@ ln￿ = ￿=(1 ￿ ￿￿);


















+ (1 ￿ ￿￿)ln￿h
￿
:
@&￿=@￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿2 > 0. Although the sign of the elasticity of f with respect to ￿ depends
on parameter values,53 @&￿=@￿ = (1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿2 ￿￿1 is unambiguously positive.￿
A.2 Rewriting the employer￿ s maximization problem in 2.5.3
By replacing R(￿;￿;￿) by D1￿￿ (a(￿;￿;￿)l)






1￿￿￿ (from (3)) in
e ￿ (￿;￿;￿) = R(￿;￿;￿) ￿ a(￿;￿;￿)l ￿ hl, I can express e ￿ (￿;￿;￿) in terms of parameter values and
￿ as
e ￿ (￿;￿;￿) =
￿
D1￿￿￿￿￿ 1





where   (￿;￿) = (￿￿￿)
￿￿
1￿￿￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿￿). Since ￿ (￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿=(1 ￿ ￿￿) 2 (0;1), the maximization
problem with respect to l is convex. The ￿rst order condition of the problem has a unique solution.
￿
A.3 Derivation of p, y, R and e ￿
Using
1.   (￿;￿) = (￿￿￿)
￿￿

















The price of a ￿rm with productivity ￿ can be expressed as p(￿;￿;￿) = (D=f￿l￿)
1￿￿ = ￿(￿;￿)=￿￿,
where ￿(￿;￿) = e ￿￿￿￿ ((1 ￿ ￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿￿))
1￿￿ and e ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)
￿(1￿￿) ￿￿￿. Firm revenue R(￿) =
Dp(￿)
1￿￿ and output y (￿) = Dp(￿)
￿￿ can then be solved accordingly. Using the solution to the em-







53&￿ > 0 if ￿￿￿Bh
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39A.4 Determining the signs of the cross partials on p, y, R and e ￿
It is useful to sign the elasticities of ￿(￿;￿) with respect to ￿ and ￿. Since ln￿(￿;￿) = lne ￿ ￿
(1 ￿ ￿)ln[(1 ￿ ￿￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿)] ￿ ￿ln￿, it follows that
1.
@ ln￿(￿;￿)












































< 0; since the ￿rst term inside the square brackets is
less than 1. After deriving the comparative statics on ￿(￿;￿), it is straightforward to do the same
for e ￿ (￿;￿;￿) as follows.
1. @ ln e ￿








@ ln e ￿
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 2






Consider the elasticity of ￿(￿;￿) with respect to ￿: @ ln￿is
@ ln￿ = ￿
￿￿(1￿￿)
1￿￿￿￿ < 0. The partial




















































40Consider two exporters, i and k, which are identical, except that labor laws are more protective
in country i than k, i.e. ￿i > ￿k. The ratio of the cuto⁄s for exporting to j between the two
exporting countries is ￿￿
ijs=￿￿








@ ln￿ < 0
together implies that ￿￿
ijs=￿￿
kjs is decreasing in ￿.￿
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Recall from the main text that Xijs =
bsNisYj
(￿Pjs)1￿￿ (￿is￿ij)









Lemma 2 postulates that ￿￿
ijs=￿￿
kjs is decreasing in ￿ as long as ￿i > ￿k. Therefore, 8Wijs > 0,
Wijs=Wkjs is increasing ￿. Similarly, given that ￿i > ￿k, Xijs=Xkjs > 1. Also, since @
@￿
@ ln￿(￿;￿)




@ ln￿ < 0, Xijs=Xkjs is increasing in ￿.￿
A.7 Solving for ￿rm-level variables in general equilibrium
This section discusses how to close the multi-sector open-economy model in general equilibrium
and derive equation (10) in the text. To this end, I make three assumptions following Chaney
(2008). First, instead of imposing the ￿rm free-entry condition, the number of ￿rms in each sector
is assumed to be proportional to the size of the economy wiLi.54 Second, ￿rm pro￿ts are distributed
back to workers through a global mutual fund. In particular, each worker in country i owns wi
shares of a global mutual fund, which collects and distributes ￿rm pro￿ts. Each shareholder gets




















Finally, I assume that ￿H ! 1. Notice that for Proposition 2 to hold, ￿H needs to be bounded.
Otherwise, the likelihood of a country￿ s exporting is not de￿ned.
Under these assumptions and the Pareto distribution assumption for ￿, the ideal price index for































































which captures country j￿ s remoteness from the rest of the world. It accounts for the impact of
both ￿xed and variable trade costs j imposes on other countries. ￿j is positively correlated with
the average trade costs for its exporters, and thus Pjs. Notice that ￿j is similar to ￿multilateral
resistance" in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). In their paper, a country￿ s multilateral resistance
54Eaton and Kortum (2002) make a similar assumption by taking the set of goods as exogenously given.
41depends on its trading partners￿respective multilateral resistances, while here ￿j summarizes the
e⁄ects on the sectoral price of j￿ s trading partners￿nominal income, Yi, and their degrees of labor
protection, ￿is, weighted by respective distances from its trading partners.
For sector s in country j, the aggregate demand term Djs = P￿￿1
js bsYj is now solved solely as
a function of Yj. I can express the volume of ￿rm-level exports xijs and the productivity threshold
for exporting ￿￿

























where ￿2 and ￿3 are sector-speci￿c constants.55 Perhaps surprisingly, xijs is increasing in ￿j.
When country j is far from any country in the world, the relative distance between i and j is
shorter. However, the e⁄ect of ￿remoteness" is likely to be dominated by both ￿xed and variable
trade costs (fij and ￿ij), which deter exports and increase the exporting threshold.
Finally, the labor market clears in each country, as long as the homogeneous-good sector is
active in all economies.￿
A.8 Deriving Xijs in equation (10)




ijs xijs (￿)G(￿). By substituting xijs (￿) with (17), ￿￿
jis with (18), and evoking the





















1, ￿js and ￿js are de￿ned in the text.￿
A.9 Deriving the empirical speci￿cations
This section discusses the derivations of the empirical speci￿cations (11) and (12). Following
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008), I make several parametric assumptions. For variable trade
costs, let ￿￿￿1
ijs ￿ D#






8s captures any (symmetric) unmeasured trade frictions for the country pair at the
sector level. For ￿xed trade costs, let fij ￿ exp
￿
 ex;i +  im;j + ’ ij ￿ ￿ijs
￿





represents unobserved ￿xed trade costs for the country pair.  ex;i is a measure of observed ￿xed
export costs in i (to any destination);  im;j captures the observed trade barrier imposed by j
on all importers;  ij represents other observed ￿xed trade costs that are speci￿c to the country
pair. Plugging these functions into equation (8) and taking log, I obtain the speci￿cation for the
second-stage gravity equation as
lnXijs = ￿ + ￿Labori ￿ Specs + ￿pjs + nis + ￿s + ￿i + ￿j ￿ #dij + !ijs + uijs.
where the explanatory variable of interest Labori￿Specs is an interaction term between i￿ s degree of
labor protection and sector s￿ s ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity. Together with the exporter ￿xed ￿j, It is
55￿2 = bs￿
￿￿1






42used to proxy for ln
￿
￿￿￿ ((1 ￿ ￿￿)=(1 ￿ ￿￿￿))
1￿￿
￿
. ￿ = (￿ ￿ 1)ln￿ is a constant; ￿s = lnbs+lne ￿
is a sector ￿xed e⁄ect; nis = lnNis; ￿j = lnYj is an importer ￿xed e⁄ect; pjs = lnPjs, dij = lnDij
and !ijs = lnWijs.
The econometric speci￿cation for the extensive margin of trade is derived from equation (9).
In the model, when there are positive trade ￿ ows between i and j in sector s, Wijs > 0. I de￿ne





such that Wijs = Z￿
ijs ￿ 1, where ￿ =
￿
￿￿1 ￿ 1 (see (9)), and
Wijs > 0 if and only if Zijs > 1. With ￿￿









This equation serves as the foundation of the ￿rst-stage estimation. Using the stochastic ￿xed and
variable trade costs speci￿ed above, I obtain the log-linear speci￿cation for the ￿rst-stage estimation
as
zijs ￿ lnZijs = ￿z + ￿zLabori ￿ Specs + ￿zpjs + ￿z
s + ￿z
i + ￿z
j ￿ #zdij ￿ ’z ij + eijs,






is an i.i.d. error term;56 ￿z
s, ￿z
j and ￿z
i are sector, importer
and exporter ￿xed e⁄ects, respectively. ￿z is a constant term and  ij is a measure of observed
￿xed trade costs between a country pair.57
With positive trade ￿ ows, Wijs > 0 and Zijs > 1, implying lnZijs > 0. Since Zijs is unob-
servable in the data, I use an indicator variable Iijs 2 f0;1g to represent lnZijs. Speci￿cally, Iijs
equals 1 if trade ￿ ows are observed from i to j in sector s, and 0 otherwise. I therefore estimate
the selection equation by a Probit model as:
￿ijs = Pr(Iijs = 1j observed vars.) (19)
= ￿
￿
￿￿ + ￿￿Labori ￿ Specs + ￿￿pjs + ￿￿
s + ￿￿
i + ￿￿
j ￿ #￿dij ￿ ’￿ ij
￿
,
where ￿(:) is the c.d.f. of a unit-normal distribution. All starred coe¢ cients represent the original
ones (with superscripts ￿ z￿ ) divided by ￿e, the standard deviation of e. This coe¢ cient transforma-
tion is essential if a unit-normal distribution of the error term is assumed.
This Probit estimation serves two purposes. First, it tests Proposition 2. Second, it permits
an imputation of b !ijs, a regressor to be included in the second-stage estimation to control for the
extensive margin of trade. I use predicted probabilities of exporting b ￿0
ijss, from estimating (12) to
impute the estimated latent variable as b z￿
ijs = ￿￿1 ￿
b ￿ijs
￿
. In turn, I estimate Wijs according to (9)





, where ￿z =
￿e(￿￿(￿￿1))
￿￿1 and b Z￿
ijs = expb z￿
ijs.58 As a result, the required
regressor b !ijs = ln c Wijs takes form as lnfexp(￿zb zijs) ￿ 1g.
Since uijs is correlated with observable trade frictions (dij) due to the Heckman sample selection,
and !ijs is also correlated with uijs because eijs = uijs + ￿ijs. According to Helpman Melitz
and Rubinstein (2008), a consistent estimation of !ijs requires controlling for ￿rm selection into
exporting conditional on positive exports, i.e. !ijs = E [!ijsjIijs = 1], and the standard Heckman
correction for sample selection bias, E [uijsjIijs = 1] = corr(uijs;eijs)(￿u=￿e)b e
￿
ijs. Both terms
56uijs and ￿ijs are assumed to be uncorrelated. Therefore, uijs and ￿ijs are jointly normal.
57Labori ￿ Specs reprensents (1 ￿ ￿)ln￿is;
￿
z
j = lnYj ￿  im;j; ￿
z




58￿e is multiplied in front of the exponent of equation (11) because in the Probit model, all variables, including
the predicted value, are divided by ￿e. See Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008) for details.












, the inverse Mills￿ratio. Thus, the consistent estimate of the
latent variable, z￿
ijs and !ijs are b z
￿
ijs = b z￿
ijs + b e
￿













Therefore, I always include both b e
￿
ijs and b !
￿
ijs as regressors when I estimate the second-stage trade
￿ ow equation.
44B Dataset Construction and De￿nition of Variables
B.1 Improving the quality of the PSID data to construct sector proxies for
￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity
The sample for constructing the sector proxies for ￿rm-speci￿c skill intensity includes observations
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) dataset (1985-1993) that satisfy the following ￿lters
in order:
1) Following the related literature, the sample is restricted to white male heads of households,
aged 18 to 64, who worked in manufacturing sectors for at least 500 hours in a year, and earned
real hourly wages of at least $2 (in 1990 dollars).
2) I follow the exact procedures reported in the ￿Variable Construction Procedures" section in
Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) to enhance data quality. This procedure identi￿es an employer
switch whenever the reported length of present employment is smaller than the time elapsed since
the last interview date. Same rule applies to sector switches. An updated employee￿ s time-series
of ￿rm tenure is constructed based on her corrected sequence of ￿rm and sector switches. The
procedure also checks consistency of the reported tenure and working experience, and make adjust-
ments accordingly. For example, a worker may report to have worked for 8 years in the previous
interview, but report 8 years again a year later. In this case, 1 year is added to the previously
reported experience. Similar corrections are made for the subsequent reported experience of the
same worker accordingly.
3) An individual might report to have been with the same employer, but have switched sector.
In that case, within the same employer-speci￿c job spell, the sector that appears more than half
of the time is identi￿ed to be the sector for that spell. If no sector appears more than 50% of the
time within a spell, all observations of that spell are dropped from the sample. This rule excludes
17% of the observations in the restricted sample after applying ￿lter 1.
4) Although returns to ￿rm tenure for di⁄erent sector are estimated using all observations, in
the end, only sectors that have at least 70 observations are retained in the sample.
B.2 Mapping industry codes from di⁄erent classi￿cation systems
B.2.1 Mapping census codes to SIC72 codes
The concordance ￿le is taken from Appendix 2 of 1981 PSID wave XIV documentation. Since there
are 76 categories under the census classi￿cation (The original classi￿cation has 81 sectors, but 5 of
them have no mapping to SIC72 codes), while there are 143 SIC72 categories, I restrict a SIC72
code from being mapped to more than one census codes. For the SIC72 categories that have more
than one census maps (SIC72 = 282, 331, 333, 334, 335, 336, 339, 357, 379), I use the average of
the speci￿c skill intensity measures across the census categories within the same SIC category as
the measure for that SIC category. Using the median has a negligible impact on the signi￿cance
of the empirical results. In the end, each of the 143 SIC72 categories has a unique assignment to a
census code.
B.2.2 Mapping SIC72 (3-digit) codes to SIC87 (3-digit) codes
The concordance ￿le is taken from Bartelsman and Gray (1996) at the NBER-CES Manufacturing
Industry Database.59 Of the 140 SIC87 3-digit codes, 136 remain the same as the SIC72 codes. For
those SIC87 (3-digit) categories that have multiple SIC72 (3-digit) categories identi￿ed, I choose
59http://www.nber.org/nberces/
45the SIC72 code that accounts for the largest shipment value. As a result, each of the 143 SIC72
3-digit categories are assigned to a unique SIC87 3-digit category.
B.2.3 Mapping SITC (4-digit rev. 2) codes to SIC87 (4-digit) codes
Mapping SITC (4-digit rev.2) codes into SIC87 (4-digit) requires ￿rst converting each of the classi￿-
cation systems to the Harmonized system (HS 10-digit). The concordance ￿le for mapping between
SITC (4 digit revision 2) codes and HS (10-digit) codes is taken from Feenstra￿ s website60. The
concordance ￿le for mapping between SIC87 (4-digit) codes and HS (10-digit) codes is taken from
Peter Schott￿ s website61. Following Nunn (2007), I use the number of 10-digit Harmonized-system
categories shared between two codes from di⁄erent classi￿cation systems to decide which SIC code
to use for a given SITC code. When more than one SIC codes are identi￿ed for a SITC code, the
SIC code that shares the most HS10 categories with that SITC code is used. For some rare cases, a
SITC code has multiple SIC codes tied in the number of HS10 categories shared (It happens for 26
SITC codes out of 760 total). In those situations, I choose the SIC category that has the highest
number of HS categories under it. As a result, 118 SIC87 3-digit codes su¢ ce to cover all SITC
codes.
B.3 Bilateral Variables
Bilateral Export Volumes at the Sector Level From Feenstra (2000), for the year 1995.
Sector-level bilateral exports data are originally disaggregated at the 4-digit SITC (4-digit rev. 2)
level.
Bilateral ￿Trade Costs" From the Centre d￿ Etudes Prospectives et d￿ Informations Inter-
nationales (CEPII).62 Physical distance between two countries is calculated using the great circle
formula. Other ￿trade costs" variables include 1) a ￿Common Language" dummy equal to 1 if at
least 9% of the population in each country￿ s speaks a common language; 2) a ￿Colony" dummy
equal to 1 if a country had been a colony of the other in the same country pair; 3) a ￿Border"
dummy equal to 1 if the countries share a common land border; 4) an ￿Island" dummy equal to
1 if one of the countries is an island; 5) a ￿Landlocked" dummy equal to 1 if one of the countries
is landlocked. 6) a "Legal" dummy equal to 1 if both trade partners share the same legal origin
(British, French, German, Scandinavian). I refer to Rose (2004) and CIA World Factbook to aug-
ment the CEPII data, so all these ￿trade costs" variables are available for all country pairs in my
sample.
Trade Partnership From the websites of the WTO and various regional trade blocs. The
RTA dummy equals 1 if both countries are signatories of one of the following regional trade agree-
ments by 1995: EU, US-Isreal, NAFTA, Canada-US, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZ-CERTA, CACM,
MERCOSUR, ASEAN, SPARTECA.
Currency Union From Glick and Rose (2002) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).
A dummy equals 1 if the importing country and the exporting country used the same currency in





Labor Regulations From Botero et al. (2004).63 A baseline labor protection index for a
country is a weighted average over two indices: the ￿Employment Laws" and ￿Collective Relations"
indices, using the principal component analysis method. The unweighted average of the two indices
is also used to check the robustness of the main results. Taken directly from Botero et al. (2004),
the ￿Employment Laws" index is an unweighted average of four subindices of the labor market: (1)
Alternative employment contracts (2) Costs of increasing hours worked (3) Costs of ￿ring workers,
(4) Dismissal procedures. The "Collective Relations" index is an unweighted average of (1) Labor
Union Power and (2) Collective Disputes. With Taiwan excluded from the sample due to missing
￿trade costs" data on bilateral variables, the sample for the baseline regression contains 84 countries.
Indices are constructed by the authors using information from countries￿legal documents in the
late 1990s.
Factor Endowments Physical capital endowment and human capital endowment are taken
from Caselli (2005). A country￿ s stock of physical capital is the natural log of the average capital
stock per worker. The stock of human capital is the natural log of the ratio of workers with a high
school degree to those who did not. The measures used are from 1992, the closest year of which
data are available. 60 of the countries in my sample have both of these measures.
Natural resources endowment is adopted from the World Bank￿ s (1997) ￿Expanding the Measure
of Wealth" dataset. A country￿ s stock of raw materials is the natural log of the estimated dollar
value of natural resources stock per worker. Natural resources included in this measure are 1)
pastureland, 2) cropland, 3) timber resources, 4) nontimber forest resources, 5) protected areas and
6) subsoil assets. 57 countries in my sample have this measure.
Price Level of Consumption From the Penn World Tables. It is the PPP over the value
of consumption divided by the exchange rate. By construction, the price level of the U.S. is set to
1, such that cross-country price levels can be compared within a year. All countries in my sample
have this measure.
Quality of the Judicial System From Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006). Data
to construct this measure were collected in 1996 by World Bank sta⁄. The measure I use is a
composite of 3 subindices, which include 1) perceptions of incidence of crime; 2) the e⁄ectiveness
and predictability of judiciary; 3) the enforceability of contracts. The original measure ranges from
-2.5 to 2.5, with a higher number indicating better judiciary. Following Nunn (2007), I rescale it
to range between 0 and 1. All countries in my sample have this measure.
Financial Development From Beck et al.￿ s (2000). It is equal to the amount of credit
extended by banks and other ￿nancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP. I use
the value from 1995. 69 of the countries in my sample have this measure.
Entry Costs From Djankov et al. (2002) for 1999. ￿Procedures to start businesses" is the
average number of legal procedures a person has to go through to start a business. ￿Days to start




Factor Intensities From Bartelsman and Gray￿ s (1996) NBER-CES Database. Following
Chor (2010), capital intensity is the log of real capital stock to total employment; skill intensity
is the log of the ratio of non-production workers to total employment; material intensity (sm) is
the ratio of the value of material costs to the sum of value added and material costs. Averages of
the intensity measures over 1990-1999 are used. Since original data are disaggregated at the SIC
4-digit level, while the level of aggregation is SIC 3-digit in this paper, I use average value over all
4-digit SIC categories within the same SIC 3-digit as my sector measure.64 All 3-digit SIC sectors
have this measure.
Dependence on Contract Enforcement From Nunn (2007). A sector is considered more
dependent on contract enforcement if a larger fraction (by value) of its inputs are not sold on an
organized exchange, according to the classi￿cation constructed by Rauch (1999). Since his measures
are grouped into BEA IO categories, I use the mapping algorithm from Nunn (2007) to map IO
categories into SIC87 categories. For cases in which multiple IO categories are identi￿ed for a given
SIC category, the IO category with the greatest number of shared HS codes is used. After applying
this procedure, three SIC 4-digit categories still have multiple IO categories identi￿ed. For these
cases, I manually pick the unique crosswalk. As a result, 389 SIC87 4-digit categories have the
contract dependence measure. The average value of all 4-digit categories within a 3-digit category
is used as the sectoral measure. All 3-digit SIC sectors have this measure.
Sales Volatility From Cuæat and Melitz (2010a), through email communication. It is the
employment-weighted standard deviation of sales growth for publicly listed ￿rms from the Compu-
stat data set over 1980-2004. All 3-digit SIC sectors have this measure.
Gross Job Flows From an updated dataset of Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) at
Haltiwanger￿ s website.65 It is the average of job creation and job destruction rates. The job creation
rate of a sector is de￿ned as the employment-weighted average of employment growth across plants
within a sector. The job destruction rate of a sector is de￿ned as employment-weighted average of
the absolute value of negative employment growth across plants within a sector. I use the annual
series of gross job ￿ ows over 1990-1999. First, I compute the employee-weighted average over all
SIC 4-digit categories within a SIC 3-digit category. Then averages are taken over 1990-1999 for
each SIC 3-digit category. All 3-digit SIC sectors have this measure.
Dependence on External Finance From Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is the fraction of
total capital expenditure over 1980-1989 not ￿nanced by internal cash ￿ ow. It is computed based
on the publicly listed ￿rms in the Compustat dataset. Original data are constructed at the ISIC
(rev.2) 3-digit industry level. I manually map them into SIC87 2-digit, and then into SIC87 3-digit
categories available in my sample. Averages are used when a mapping goes from a lower to a higher
level of aggregation.
Value-added Share From Bartelsman and Gray￿ s (1996) NBER-CES Database. It is an
industry￿ s value added divided by total manufacturing value added of shipment. Averages are
taken over 1990-1999. All 3-digit SIC sectors have this measure.
64Instead of the averages, the medians of the intensity measures are also used as my 3-digit level measure. The
empirical results remain robust upon using the medians.
65http://econweb.umd.edu/~haltiwan/download.htm
48TFP Growth From Bartelsman and Gray￿ s (1996) NBER-CES Database. It is an industry￿ s
annual growth rate in total factor productivity. Averages are taken over 1990-1999. All 3-digit SIC
sectors have this measure.
49 
Figure 2: Countries’ Firm-specific Skill Intensity of Exports and 
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377  Petroleum refining (291)  0.322  1.000  0.555  1.000  1.000  98 
289  Beverage industries (208)  0.250  0.813  0.331  0.639  0.705  94 
127  Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products (324, 327)  0.195  0.671  0.268  0.536  0.708  91 
357  Drugs and medicines (283)  0.193  0.667  0.360  0.685  0.636  81 
287  Bakery products (205)  0.191  0.662  0.364  0.691  0.512  106 
329  Miscellaneous paper and pulp products (264)  0.189  0.656  0.368  0.697  0.787  74 
189  Electronic computing equipment (3573)  0.184  0.643  0.283  0.561  0.311  324 
328  Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills (261‐263, 266)*  0.180  0.632  0.273  0.543  0.626  95 
369  Not specified chemicals and allied products  0.178  0.628  0.302  0.591  0.538  70 
187  Metalworking machinery (354)  0.148  0.551  0.209  0.440  0.487  139 
108  Sawmills, planing mills, and mill work (242, 243)  0.146  0.544  0.257  0.518  0.631  278 
118  Furniture and fixtures (25)  0.129  0.502  0.189  0.408  0.435  227 
247  Optical and health services supplies (383, 384, 385)  0.129  0.501  0.335  0.645  0.633  95 
337  Paperboard containers and boxes (265)  0.124  0.488  0.313  0.609  0.620  95 
319  Apparel and accessories (231‐238)  0.117  0.470  0.270  0.539  0.547  135 
219  Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment (371)  0.112  0.457  0.218  0.455  0.465  805 
208 
Electrical machinery, equipment, and supplies, n.e.c. (361, 362, 
364, 367, 369)  0.110  0.451  0.172  0.381  0.436  362 
268  Meat products (201)*  0.106  0.442  0.212  0.446  0.492  223 
139 
Blast furnaces, steel works, rolling and finishing mills (3312, 
3313)  0.106  0.442  0.188  0.407  0.641  121 
339 
Printing, publishing, and allied industries, except newspapers 
(272‐279)*  0.106  0.442  0.237  0.485  0.425  438 
227  Aircraft and parts (372)  0.098  0.421  0.258  0.520  0.508  369 
379  Rubber products (301‐303, 306)  0.094  0.410  0.170  0.378  0.474  135 
259  Miscellaneous manufacturing industries (39)*  0.090  0.399  0.153  0.350  0.460  174 
179  Construction and material handling machines (353)  0.088  0.395  0.164  0.367  0.369  166 
168 
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products (341, 343, 347, 348, 
349)  0.075  0.362  0.145  0.336  0.590  192 
228  Ship and boat building and repairing (373)*  0.059  0.319  0.095  0.256  0.150  198 
197  Machinery, except electrical, n.e.c (355, 356, 358, 359)*  0.058  0.317  0.118  0.294  0.261  350 
338  Newspaper publishing and printing (271)*  0.050  0.296  0.136  0.322  0.222  189 




317  Yarn, thread, and fabric mills (221‐224, 228)*  0.038  0.265  0.131  0.314  0.451  150 
158  Fabricated structural metal products (344)  0.036  0.261 ‐ 0.004  0.096  0.078  212 
239  Scientific and controlling instruments (381, 382)*  0.022  0.224  0.055  0.191  0.490  71 
188  Office and accounting machines (357 except 3573)* 
 
0.014  0.203  0.199  0.425  0.283  72 
258  Ordnance* ‐ 0.016  0.036  0.076  0.129  0.536  101 
119  Glass and glass products (321‐323)* ‐ 0.003 0.064  ‐ 0.063  0.000  0.080  83 
207  Radio, T.V., and communication equipment (365, 366) ‐ 0.065  0.000 ‐ 0.010  0.086  0.000  157 
* not significant at the 5% level.   53










1  Kazakhstan  1.000  31  Vietnam  0.596  61  Dominican Republic 
khn  0.403 
2  Portugal 
khn  0.985  32  Korea, Rep. 
khn  0.595  62  Morocco 
kn  0.392 
3  France 
khn  0.957  33  Mali 
khn  0.592  63  Egypt, Arab Rep. 
khn  0.386 
4  Russia  0.919  34  Philippines 
khn  0.584  64  Thailand 
khn  0.357 
5  Mozambique 
khn  0.898  35  Greece 
khn  0.583  65  China 
khn  0.344 
6  Norway 
khn  0.892  36  Burkina Faso 
kn  0.570  66  Uganda 
kh  0.341 
7  Georgia  0.867  37  Sri Lanka 
khn  0.568  67  Zimbabwe 
khn  0.334 
8  Spain 
khn  0.867  38  Finland 
khn  0.560  68  Australia 
khn  0.330 
9  Germany  0.858  39  Argentina 
khn  0.555  69  Hong Kong, China 
kh  0.286 
10  Italy 
khn  0.846  40  Denmark 
khn  0.550  70  Singapore 
khn  0.266 
11  Sweden 
khn  0.810  41  Bulgaria  0.536  71  Pakistan 
khn  0.254 
12  Peru 
khn  0.795  42  Tanzania 
k  0.528  72  Uruguay 
khn  0.253 
13  Ukraine  0.794  43  Madagascar 
kn  0.527  73  Israel 
khn  0.213 
14  Latvia  0.789  44  Croatia  0.523  74  Kenya 
khn  0.179 
15  Poland  0.764  45  Romania 
khn  0.519  75  Mongolia  0.150 
16  Slovenia  0.747  46  Belgium 
khn  0.509  76  United States 
khn  0.102 
17  Mexico 
khn  0.743  47  South Africa 
khn  0.500  77  Zambia 
khn  0.086 
18  Venezuela, RB 
khn  0.739  48  Brazil 
khn  0.500  78  United Kingdom 
khn  0.071 
19  Kyrgyzstan  0.728  49  Lebanon  0.491  79  Canada 
khn  0.065 
20  Netherlands 
khn  0.716  50  Turkey 
khn  0.482  80  Malawi 
khn  0.063 
21  Tunisia 
khn  0.690  51  Japan 
khn  0.475  81  New Zealand 
khn  0.049 
22  Armenia  0.682  52  Switzerland 
khn  0.456  82  Jamaica 
khn  0.024 
23  Senegal 
khn  0.676  53  Colombia 
khn  0.451  83  Nigeria 
kn  0.023 
24  Lithuania  0.675  54  Bolivia 
khn  0.446  84  Malaysia 
khn  0.000 
25  Ecuador 
khn  0.661  55  Chile 
khn  0.432      
26  Slovakia  0.651  56  Austria 
khn  0.429      
27  Panama 
khn  0.629  57  Ireland 
khn  0.427      
28  Hungary 
hn  0.613  58  Czech Rep 
k  0.421      
29  Indonesia 
khn  0.602  59  India 
khn  0.413      
30  Jordan 
khn  0.601  60  Ghana 
















Labor x Spec.  0.076**  0.068**  0.065**  0.066**  0.066**  0.067** 
  (2.45)  (2.02)  (2.13)  (2.21)  (2.11)  (2.17) 
ln(K/L) x Capital Intensity   0.162 ‐ 0.047 ‐ 0.031 ‐ 0.048 ‐ 0.035 
   (0.98)  (‐0.26)  (‐0.17)  (‐0.26)  (‐0.19) 
ln(H/L) x Skill Intensity   0.392***  0.393***  0.362***  0.398***  0.370*** 
   (6.41)  (6.33)  (5.22)  (6.27)  (5.27) 
ln(Resource/L) x Mat. Intensity     0.581***  0.642***  0.573***  0.627*** 
     (4.08)  (3.83)  (3.96)  (3.70) 
Ln(RGDP) x Value added       0.185   0.175 
       (1.06)   (0.96) 
Ln(RGDP) x TFP Growth       0.052   0.066 
       (0.36)   (0.40) 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Num. of Observations  4153  3141  3009  3009  2972  2972 
Num. of Countries  84  60  57  57  50  50 
Num. of SIC Sectors  62  62  62  62  62  62 
R
2  0.76  0.77  0.77  0.77  0.77  0.77 
         
Panel B: 2SLS Estimation         
Labor x Spec.  0.159***  0.165***  0.144***  0.145***  0.148***  0.149*** 
















Panel A: OLS Estimation  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Labor x Spec.  0.080***  0.057*  0.067**  0.071**  0.062**  0.098*** 
  (2.71)  (1.97)  (2.18)  (2.42)  (2.06)  (3.70) 
ln(K/L) x Spec. ‐ 0.315**         ‐ 0.858* 
  (‐2.54)        (‐1.97) 
ln(H/L) x Spec.   ‐ 0.117**       ‐ 0.039 
   (‐2.63)       (‐0.65) 
ln(Resource/L) x Spec.     0.133     0.462*** 
     (1.12)     (3.69) 
Ln(RGDP) x Spec.       ‐ 0.294**   0.566 
       (‐2.34)  (1.26) 
Judicial Quality x Spec.         ‐ 0.112** ‐ 0.065 
         (‐2.51)  (‐0.89) 
Additional Controls  ln(K/L)xCapital Intensity; ln(H/L)xSkill Intensity; ln(Res/L)xMat. Intensity 
Country Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Sector Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Num. of Observations  3009  3009  3009  3009  2966  2966 
Num. of Countries  57  57  57  57  55  55 
Num. of SIC Sectors  62  62  62  62  62  62 
R
2  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.78  0.79  0.79 
            
Panel B: 2SLS Estimation            
Labor x Spec.  0.164***  0.133***  0.138***  0.155***  0.133***  0.153*** 
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Labor x Spec.  0.759***  0.765***  1.024***  1.048***  1.001***  0.076*** 
  (7.79)  (7.57)  (9.83)  (9.76)  (8.83)  (8.83) 
ln(distance) ‐ 0.627*** ‐ 0.629*** ‐ 0.635*** ‐ 0.647*** ‐ 0.664*** ‐ 0.312*** 
  (‐27.25)  (‐26.71)  (‐26.41)  (‐26.79)  (‐27.06)  (‐27.06) 
Ever Colony  0.534***  0.505***  0.507***  0.522***  0.525***  0.064*** 
  (8.57)  (7.79)  (7.71)  (7.85)  (7.79)  (7.79) 
Common Language  0.0882**  0.0592  0.0551  0.0479  0.0709*  0.017* 
  (2.23)  (1.50)  (1.38)  (1.17)  (1.67)  (1.67) 
Common Border  0.703***  0.721***  0.702***  0.704***  0.700***  0.077*** 
  (9.04)  (8.88)  (8.03)  (7.90)  (7.55)  (7.55) 
Common Legal Origin  0.194***  0.181***  0.184***  0.188***  0.185***  0.045*** 
  (6.56)  (6.23)  (6.18)  (6.07)  (5.81)  (5.81) 
RTA Members  0.422 ‐ 0.0232 ‐ 0.0422 ‐ 0.0280 ‐ 0.177 ‐ 0.005 
  (1.31)  (‐0.07)  (‐0.13)  (‐0.09)  (‐0.47)  (‐0.47) 
Currency Union  0.216***  0.207***  0.208***  0.198***  0.195***  0.044*** 
  (5.53)  (5.27)  (5.10)  (4.63)  (4.44)  (4.44) 
Any Landlocked  0.497*  0.504**  0.465**  0.469**  0.913***  0.024*** 
  (1.96)  (1.99)  (2.16)  (2.15)  (3.06)  (3.06) 
Any Island ‐ 0.0844 ‐ 0.118 ‐ 0.143 ‐ 0.222** ‐ 0.224** ‐ 0.017** 
  (‐0.84)  (‐1.29)  (‐1.54)  (‐2.00)  (‐2.00)  (‐2.00) 
ln(K/L) x Capital Intensity     ‐ 0.029*** ‐ 0.059*** ‐ 0.014 ‐ 0.061 
     (‐2.62)  (‐5.19)  (‐1.23)  (‐1.23) 
ln(H/L) x Skill Intensity     2.230***  2.283***  1.859***  0.417*** 
     (25.24)  (25.51)  (20.33)  (20.33) 
ln(M/L) x Mat. Intensity      0.144***  0.132***  0.429*** 
      (9.53)  (8.80)  (8.80) 
ln(Num. of Est.)       0.202***  0.195*** 
       (21.66)  (21.66) 
R
2  0.471  0.475  0.472  0.479  0.485  0.485 
Num. of exporters  84  84  60  57  53  53 
Num. of clusters  4363  3987  3701  3595  3496  3496 
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Labor x Spec.  0.746***  0.760***  0.807***  0.765***  0.689*** 
  (10.24)  (10.19)  (10.52)  (9.88)  (8.48) 
ln(distance) ‐ 0.697*** ‐ 0.713*** ‐ 0.738*** ‐ 0.743*** ‐ 0.756*** 
  (‐42.38)  (‐41.89)  (‐40.77)  (‐39.12)  (‐38.39) 
Ever Colony  0.578***  0.589***  0.616***  0.620***  0.614*** 
  (9.46)  (9.26)  (8.96)  (8.87)  (8.62) 
Common Language  0.195***  0.193***  0.185***  0.199***  0.233*** 
  (7.80)  (7.42)  (6.82)  (7.13)  (7.88) 
Common Border  0.240**  0.241**  0.247**  0.254**  0.200 
  (2.25)  (2.21)  (2.09)  (2.13)  (1.64) 
Common Legal Origin  0.135***  0.138***  0.139***  0.139***  0.135*** 
  (6.70)  (6.67)  (6.44)  (6.15)  (5.79) 
RTA Members  0.044*  0.042*  0.034  0.023  0.014 
  (1.91)  (1.77)  (1.35)  (0.87)  (0.51) 
Currency Union  0.255  0.286  0.282  0.285  0.163 
  (0.86)  (0.88)  (0.84)  (0.84)  (0.36) 
Any Landlocked  0.0610  0.0532 ‐ 0.0203 ‐ 0.0389  0.132 
  (0.69)  (0.59)  (‐0.23)  (‐0.43)  (1.17) 
Any Island  0.107  0.136*  0.130  0.0585  0.0472 
  (1.50)  (1.75)  (1.59)  (0.65)  (0.52) 
Procedures to Start Businesses ‐ 0.624*** ‐ 0.638*** ‐ 0.697*** ‐ 0.660*** ‐ 0.650*** 
  (‐4.82)  (‐4.88)  (‐5.18)  (‐4.80)  (‐4.61) 
Days to Start Businesses ‐ 0.087*** ‐ 0.078*** ‐ 0.094*** ‐ 0.118*** ‐ 0.126*** 
  (‐3.82)  (‐3.37)  (‐3.92)  (‐4.66)  (‐4.87) 
ln(K/L) x Capital Intensity    0.026***  0.006  0.031*** 
     (4.22)  (0.96)  (4.49) 
ln(H/L) x Skill Intensity     1.834***  1.864***  1.629*** 
     (36.19)  (36.06)  (31.87) 
ln(Resource/L) x Mat. Intensity      0.114***  0.110*** 
      (14.25)  (13.37) 
ln(Number of Establishments)       0.155*** 
       (27.29) 
Log‐likelihood ‐ 102725 ‐ 98362 ‐ 89811 ‐ 84785 ‐ 79941 
Num. of exporters  71  71  60  57  53 
Num. of clusters  7739  7526  6360  6042  5618 



























Panel A: Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
 
Labor x Spec.  0.947***  0.979***  0.989***  1.011***  0.970***  1.079*** 
  (5.30)  (5.64)  (5.26)  (5.69)  (5.78)  (9.06) 
ln(K/L) x Capital Intensity    ‐ 0.012 ‐ 0.041  0.005 ‐ 0.00239 
     (‐1.01)  (‐3.63)  (0.42)  (‐0.20) 
ln(H/L) x Skill Intensity     2.256***  2.247***  1.842***  1.964*** 
     (6.32)  (6.46)  (6.18)  (20.34) 
ln(Resource/L) x Mat. Intensity      0.129***  0.117***  0.134*** 
       (5.02)  (4.72)  (8.60) 
eijs  1.577***  1.513***  1.431***  1.391***  1.413***  
  (7.68)  (7.95)  (7.05)  (7.18)  (7.60)  
δ(from wijs)  0.749***  0.693***  0.746***  0.761***  0.734***  
  (2.88)  (2.83)  (2.93)  (3.14)  (3.11)  
         
Panel B: Flexible specification: OLS using 50 bins for predicted probability 
 
Labor x Spec.  1.178***  1.182***  1.207***  1.242***  1.147***  1.079*** 
  (10.78)  (10.78)  (10.97)  (11.01)  (9.76)  (9.06) 
ln(K/L) x Capital Intensity    ‐ 0.006 ‐ 0.039***  0.013 ‐ 0.00239 
     (‐0.53)  (‐3.44)  (1.11)  (‐0.20) 
ln(H/L) x Skill Intensity     2.743***  2.810***  2.244***  1.964*** 
     (22.05)  (21.61)  (18.05)  (20.34) 
ln(Resource/L) x Mat. Intensity      0.160***  0.141***  0.134*** 
       (9.53)  (8.49)  (8.60) 
R
2  0.506  0.510  0.525  0.533  0.540  0.485 
         
Num. of exporters  71  71  60  57  53  53 
Num. of clusters  3194  3,047  2927  2852  2777  2777 






















Labor x Spec.  0.694***  2.677***  1.008***  0.830***  0.549*** 
  (6.00)  (3.12)  (5.69)  (4.99)  (3.35) 
# exporters  23  34  56  57  57 
# clusters  1926  1547  2844  2849  2823 
# observations  54253  21716  75897  74807  70057 
Controls include exporter, importer and sector fixed effects; Interactions between 1) capital endowment and 
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Labor x Spec.  1.010***  0.860***  0.972***  0.953***  0.816***  0.060*** 
  (5.69)  (5.48)  5.49)  (5.41)  (5.05)  (5.05) 
Labor x Volatility ‐ 0.791* ‐ 0.027***  ‐ 0.848** ‐ 0.024***  ‐0.066*** 
  (‐1.87)  (‐3.92)   (‐2.01)  (‐3.46)  (‐3.46) 
Judicial x Contract Dep.     2.427***  2.434***   1.253**  0.115** 
     (4.10)  (4.11)  (2.11)  (2.11) 
# exporters  57  57  56  56  56  56 
# clusters  2852  2852  2840  2840  72207  72207 
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Dependent Variable: (ln) bilateral exports from i to j by sector: ln(Xijs) 











Labor x Spec.  1.018***  0.772***  1.098***  0.946***  0.730***  0.635***  0.521*** 
  (5.59)  (4.72)  (5.73)  (5.43)  (4.66)  (3.51)  (3.08) 
ln(rgdp per cap.) x Spec. ‐ 0.176***        1.049***  1.054*** 
  (‐3.75)        (3.79)  (3.82) 
ln(H/L) x Spec   ‐ 1.194***      ‐ 2.557*** ‐ 2.567*** 
   (‐4.92)      (‐6.58)  (‐6.60) 
ln(K/L) x Spec     ‐ 0.213***    ‐ 0.890*** ‐ 0.886*** 
     (‐4.61)    (‐4.21)  (‐4.20) 
Judicial x Spec       ‐ 0.792***   3.042***  3.016*** 
       (‐3.27)   (6.79)  (6.74) 
ln(credit/L) x Spec.        ‐ 0.498*** ‐ 0.794*** ‐ 0.786*** 
         (‐4.90)  (‐6.56)  (‐6.53) 
Labor x Volatility           ‐ 0.272 ‐ 0.022 
           (‐0.65)  (‐3.33) 
# exporters  57  57  57  56  56  56  56 
# clusters  2852  2852  2852  2840  2777  2777  2777 
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Labor x Spec.  1.042***  1.006***  0.875***  1.222***  0.859***  0.969***  0.882*** 
  (5.58)  (5.96)  (6.17)  (5.95)  (5.16)   (5.52)  (6.60) 
Labor x Value added  0.337         ‐ 0.951*** 
  (1.51)         (‐3.73) 
Labor x Skill Intensity   0.150*       ‐ 0.093 
   (1.89)       (‐1.20) 
Labor x Capital Intensity     0.115**      0.162** 
     (2.40)      (2.81) 
Labor x Contract Dep.       1.678***    2.521*** 
       (5.62)    (7.28) 
Labor x Ext. Fin. Dep.         ‐ 0.188*   ‐ 0.224** 
         (‐1.80)  (‐2.20) 
Labor x TFP Growth         ‐ 5.306*** ‐ 10.422*** 
         (‐4.51)  (‐6.63) 
# exporters  57  57  57  56  56  56  56 
# clusters  2852  2852  2852  2777  2777  2777  2777 
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Table A1: Summary Statistics of Sector-level Variables (SIC87 3-digit)  
 
   Min  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Max  Std. Dev  No. Obs 
Firm‐Spec  0.000  0.261  0.317    0.410   0.470  0.656  1.000  0.180  62 
Capital Intensity  2.306  3.012  3.666  4.022  4.575  5.369  6.773  0.860  118 
Skill Intensity ‐ 2.250 ‐ 1.832 ‐ 1.672 ‐ 1.377 ‐ 1.190 ‐ 0.888 ‐ 0.400  0.371  118 
Material Intensity  2.903  3.617  3.912  4.251    4.839  5.311  7.424  0.717  118 
Sales Volatility  0.084  0.124  0.141  0.157    0.187  0.225  0.336  0.044  118 
Gross Job Flows  7.534  12.410  16.247  18.466  22.264  23.694  38.731  5.110  118 
Contract Dep.  0.331  0.640  0.794  0.951  0.973  0.987  0.998  0.155  118 





















Skill Intensity  0.073  0.143       
Material Intensity  0.438  0.758 ‐ 0.014      
Sales Volatility ‐ 0.062 ‐ 0.111  0.002 ‐ 0.088     
Gross Job Flows ‐ 0.203 ‐ 0.630  0.028 ‐ 0.388  0.277    
Contract Dep. ‐ 0.238 ‐ 0.198  0.464 ‐ 0.388  0.011  0.283  
Ext. Fin. Dep. ‐ 0.313 ‐ 0.137  0.263 ‐ 0.194  0.457  0.172  0.244 
 
 
Table A3: Summary Statistics of Country Variables 
 
   Min  10th  25th  50th  75th  90th  Max  Std. Dev  No. Obs. 
Labor Protection  0  0.102  0.372  0.527  0.686  0.858  1  0.250  84 
ln(real GDP/L)  6.448  7.097  8.105  8.880  9.872  10.187  10.817  1.097  82 
ln(H/L)  0.092  0.469  0.594  0.827  1.005  1.088  1.224  0.270  61 
ln(K/L)  6.054  7.554  8.984  10.290  11.604  11.813  11.996  1.611  65 
ln(Resource/L)  6.666  7.197  7.564  8.298  8.981  9.482  10.912  0.983  62 
ln(Credit/GDP) ‐ 3.326 ‐ 2.433 ‐ 1.607 ‐ 0.974 ‐ 0.305  0.014  0.509  0.913  69 




Table A4: Correlation between Country Variables 
 
   Labor Protection  ln(real GDP/L)  ln(H/L)  ln(K/L)  ln(Resource/L)  ln(Credit/GDP) 
ln(real GDP/L)  0.101  1       
ln(H/L) ‐ 0.072  0.834  1      
ln(K/L)  0.124  0.971  0.860  1    
ln(Resource/L) ‐ 0.007  0.666  0.632  0.660  1  
ln(Credit/GDP)  0.011  0.684  0.580  0.678  0.326  1 
Judicial Quality ‐ 0.015  0.838  0.773  0.812  0.549  0.682 
  